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Ad Law Incarcerated 
Giovanna Shay†
INTRODUCTION: THE REGULATION OF “MASS INCARCERATION”1
The United States has over two million prisoners,2 the largest incarcerated 
population worldwide.3  Our nation has been described as a “carceral state” 
with a policy of “mass imprisonment,”4 and our vast prison system has been 
termed a “prison industrial complex.”5  Massive growth in the prison 
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 1. The term “mass incarceration” has entered the lexicon to describe the unprecedented use 
of incarceration in the United States.  See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE 
GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006).  See also JEREMY 
TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY xix 
(2005) (describing “mass incarceration” as “a phrase used by a number of commentators”). 
 2. The Sentencing Project, News - Incarceration (2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
template/page.cfm?id=107. 
 3. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 5 (2008) 
(“[M]ore than 1 in 100 adults is now locked up in America.”); Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. 
Dwarfs Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1. 
 4. See, e.g., GOTTSCHALK, supra note 1, at 1-17. 
 5. Craig Haney, Counting Casualties in the War on Prisoners, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 87, 88 n.5 
(Summer 2008).  See also RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, 
AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 7 (2007) [hereinafter, “GILMORE, GOLDEN 
GULAG”] (situating the 500% increase in California’s prison population between 1982 and 2000 in 
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population over the last thirty years has had a severely disparate racial impact.6  
The devastating effects of mass incarceration—on prisoners, their families, and 
communities—have been well-documented.7  Some commentators have 
suggested that the “prison-industrial complex” is the most recent in a series of 
regimes that have maintained racial subordination—an extension of slavery and 
de jure segregation,8 and a means of controlling the “remnants of the black 
ghetto.”9
This Article examines one part of the legal regime administering “mass 
incarceration” that has not been a focus of legal scholarship: prison and jail 
policies and regulation.  Prison and jail regulation is the administrative law of 
the “carceral state,”10 governing an incarcerated population of millions, a 
majority of whom are people of color.11  The result is an extremely regressive 
form of policy-making, affecting poor communities and communities of color 
most directly.12  Indeed, if “the category of ‘inmate’ in the United States today 
California’s changing political economy). 
 6. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE 
RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 1 (July 2007) (“If current trends continue, 
one in three black males born today can expect to spend time in prison during his lifetime.”).  
While recent statistics show that the number of African-Americans serving time in state prisons 
for drug offenses fell 21.6% between 1999-2005, two-thirds of the people serving time in state 
institutions for drug crimes are African-Americans or Latinos.  MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT, THE CHANGING RACIAL DYNAMICS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 1-3 (2009). 
 7. See INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) [hereinafter “INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT”]; Nekima Levy-Pounds, From the Frying Pan Into the Fire: How Poor Women of 
Color and Children Are Affected by Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums, 47 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 285, 298 (2007) (“[W]hile African-Americans make up roughly thirteen percent 
of our nation’s population, African-American women account for thirty-five percent of the federal 
female prison population and forty-eight percent of state female prison populations.”); Tracey 
Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1998); 
Dorothy Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American 
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004). 
 8. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 22-39 (2003) (making a connection 
between slavery and the penitentiary in the United States, including the convict-lease system and 
“Black codes”); Kim Shayo Buchanan, Impunity: Sexual Abuse in Women’s Prisons, 42 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 45, 48-49, 55-60 (2007) (drawing on Reva Siegel’s theory of status regime 
modernization to connect rape of African-American women in slavery to custodial sexual abuse of 
women prisoners); Loic Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration, 13 NEW LEFT REV. 41 
(Jan.-Feb. 2002) [hereinafter “Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration”] (writing that 
“slavery and mass imprisonment are genealogically linked”); Loic Wacquant, The New ‘Peculiar 
Institution:’ On the Prison as a Surrogate Ghetto, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 377 (Aug. 
2000) [hereinafter “Wacquant, Peculiar Institution”]. 
 9. Loic Wacquant in RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES 57, 61-62 (Glenn 
Loury ed., 2008) [hereinafter: “RACE, INCARCERATION”]. 
 10. Cf. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 1, at 1 (describing “the construction of the carceral state in 
America”). 
 11. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008-STATISTICAL TABLES 17 (2009), available at 
http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf (At mid-year 2008, sixty percent of 2,103,500 
inmates in state or federal prisons, or in local jails, were Black or Hispanic.). 
 12. Cf. Gia B. Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government Institutions and 
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. . . [is] a racialized one,”13 corrections regulation may be conceived as a kind 
of racialized law-making.  Although it has disparate impact, however, its 
effects extend beyond the communities most affected. 
Corrections policies govern every area of prison life and many issues 
affecting prisoners’ families and neighborhoods.  These include: medical and 
mental health care, visitation, telephone usage, mail, access to lawyers, sexual 
abuse policies, and programming such as vocational and educational courses.  
Some rules decide tremendously personal issues relating to core definitions of 
self.  For example, corrections policies determine who is counted in a 
prisoner’s “family,” and thus may visit,14 and whether a prisoner is deemed 
male or female for housing purposes.15  Other policies, such as those regarding 
release and reentry, can have an important aggregate effect on free 
communities.  With about 700,000 prisoners returning home annually,16 many 
of them going to concentrated areas of only a few city blocks, such rules can 
have a great impact on poor neighborhoods.17
Despite its importance, the area of corrections regulation is a kind of “no-
man’s land.”  In many jurisdictions, and in many subject areas, prison and jail 
regulations are formulated outside of public view.  Because of the deference 
afforded prison and jail officials under prevailing constitutional standards, such 
regulations are not given extensive judicial attention.  Nor do they receive 
much focus in the scholarly literature.18  The purpose of this Article is to 
Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1691, 1715, 1738-45 (2009) (arguing for a “free speech conditional 
deference model,” in which courts defer only to formal speech policies in prisons and other 
governmental institutions, in part because, “about one in three Black males in the United States 
will go to prison during his lifetime,” and “[i]n light of these numbers, it is clear that the nature 
and extent of speech rights within government institutions has a widespread, and sometimes 
severe or disproportionate, impact on the abilities of our nation’s communities to pursue 
autonomy and self-fulfillment”). 
 13. Sharon Dolovich, Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 255 
(2009) [hereinafter “Dolovich, Incarceration American-Style”].  See also Glenn C. Loury in 
RACE, INCARCERATION, supra note 9, at 36-37. 
 14. Kacy Elizabeth Wiggum, Defining Family in American Prisons, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP.  357 (2009). 
 15. See D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Gender Classification and Housing, Program Statement No. 
4020.3 (Feb. 20, 2009) (“DOC shall classify an inmate who has male genitals as a male and one 
who has female genitals as a female, unless otherwise classified by the Transgender Committee 
consistent with this policy.”). 
 16. KAMELA MALLIK-KANE & CHRISTY VISHER, HEALTH & PRISONER REENTRY: HOW 
PHYSICAL, MENTAL & SUBSTANCE ABUSE CONDITIONS SHAPE THE PROCESS OF REINTEGRATION 
1 (2008). 
 17. ERIC CADORA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: AN 
EXPLORATION OF OVERLAPPING NEEDS, RESOURCES AND INTERESTS IN BROOKLYN 
NEIGHBORHOODS (2002).  See also Margaret E. Finzen, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral 
Consequences of Incarceration and Their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY 
L. & POL’Y 299, 320 (2005). 
 18. See Jonathan Simon, The ‘Society of Captives’ in the Era of Hyper-Incarceration, 4 
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 285, 289 (Aug. 2000) (noting that “studies of prison social 
organization” have become less common “precisely during the time of the great expansion of 
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accord prison and jail regulation more sustained attention.  Specifically, it 
argues that corrections policies should be subject to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures, to promote transparency and democratic participation.  
Alternatively, courts should scrutinize regulations that are not promulgated 
pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking more carefully. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I first sketches the history of 
court involvement in prison reform, explaining that prison litigation made 
institutions more bureaucratic and increased the importance of corrections 
policies.  It then outlines how the legal standards by which courts currently 
judge corrections policies extend deference to prison officials.  Part II discusses 
the extent to which corrections policies are exempt from state administrative 
procedure acts: In many states, corrections regulations are exempt or partially 
exempt from the provisions of state administrative procedure acts.  This Part 
then describes how both prisoners and free communities are affected by 
corrections policies.  Part III argues that, because of this impact, corrections 
regulations should be subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking or, in the 
alternative, should be scrutinized more carefully by courts. 
I.  COURTS AND PRISON REGULATION 
A.  Litigation and Bureaucratization 
The story of prison regulation is best understood against the backdrop of 
prison reform efforts.19  As corrections systems responded to litigation in the 
1970s by becoming more bureaucratized, prison regulation became more 
important.20  After significant victories in the 1970s and early 1980s,21 
however, so-called “structural reform”22 prison litigation was restricted by 
incarceration”).  A few commentators, notably in recent years Professor Rachel Barkow, have 
considered the application of administrative law concepts to criminal justice agencies.  See Rachel 
Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 721 n.4 (2005) (focusing on the design of 
sentencing commissions: “[w]hile scholars have analyzed the structure and design of agencies in a 
multitude of areas, the agencies responsible for criminal justice policy have commanded far less 
attention”); Rachel Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons From 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009) (analyzing how administrative law principles 
could be used to check prosecutorial discretion); Rachel Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative 
State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332 (discussing how the rise of the 
administrative law paradigm depressed use of jury nullification and executive clemency); Marya 
P. McDonald, A Multidimensional Look at the Gender Crisis in the Correctional System, 15 LAW 
& INEQ. 505, 535-44 (1997) (arguing that applying administrative law principles to review 
corrections officials’ actions is a good way to address unequal programming in women’s prisons). 
 19. See infra notes 21-80 and accompanying text. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE 39-46 (1998). 
 22. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 9-10 (1978) (describing use of 
“structural injunction” as “seeking to effectuate the reform of a social institution”).  See also 
Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and 
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judge-made doctrines23 and, most decisively, by the 1996 Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (“PLRA”).24  This transformation occurred under the guise of 
deference to an increasingly professionalized corrections establishment.  While 
courts previously adopted an explicit “hands-off” policy towards prisons,25 
they now deferred to corrections authorities’ expertise.26  Today, the resultant 
lack of scrutiny of corrections policies further reinforces the race and class 
hierarchies of mass incarceration.27
However, courts’ deference to prison and jail rules is not finely calibrated.  
Judicial opinions often refer to corrections policies as if they are a monolithic 
block of regulations made through uniform processes.28  In reality, the category 
of administrative documents containing corrections policies encompasses a 
wide-range of edicts, ranging from full-fledged state regulations subject to 
notice-and-comment rulemaking to informal memoranda circulated by sheriffs.  
When courts defer to corrections officials and their policies, they are deferring 
to judgments that are often unchecked by the type of rulemaking procedures 
that are the norm in other contexts. 
Until the 1960s, federal courts adopted a “hands-off doctrine” with respect 
to prison and jail litigation.29  Courts believed they were powerless “to 
supervise prison administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or 
regulations.”30  This “hands-off” attitude was a combination of “procedural and 
Jails: A Framework for Analysis and a Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS 12, 15 
(John J. DiIulio, Jr. ed., 1990) (discussing Fiss’s concept of “structural reform” litigation). 
 23. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 46-50. 
 24. Id. at 382-83.  The PLRA is codified in several different parts of the U.S. Code.  Pub. L. 
No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66-77 (1996) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2004); 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626 (2008); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915, 1915A, 1932 (2003); 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1997a-1997h (2009)). 
 25. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the 
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 508 (1963) [hereinafter “Beyond the Ken”]. 
 26. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 27. See Buchanan, supra note 8, at 86; Michael B. Mushlin & Naomi Roslyn Galtz, Getting 
Real About Race and Prisoner Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27 (2009). 
 28. See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. 78. 
 29. See James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-80, in 
NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 
429, 433 (1980) [hereinafter “Jacobs, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement”] (“Until the 1960s the 
federal judiciary adhered to a ‘hands off’ attitude toward prison cases out of concern for 
federalism and separation of powers and a fear that judicial review of administrative decisions 
would undermine prison security and discipline.”); Ira P. Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the 
Federal Courts: The Future of Federal Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 211-13 (1980).  See also Beyond the Ken, supra note 25, at 508, cited in 
Allison Brill, Rights Without Remedy: The Myth of State Court Accessibility After the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 652-53 (2008).  But see Alexander Reinert, 
Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit From Proportionality 
Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 59-60 (2009) (collecting cases in which state courts, relying 
on state law provisions, invalidated sentences as “cruel and unusual”). 
 30. Beyond the Ken, supra note 25, at 506 (quoting Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th 
Cir. 1954)). 
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substantive” legal doctrines.31  For example, one of the most important vehicles 
for prisoners’ suits is the civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983.32  Until Monroe 
v. Pape in 1961,33 courts interpreted the “under color of state law” language of 
the civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 not to provide a cause of action for 
abuses that violated state law,34 and until the 1960s, prisoner complaints were 
also routinely thrown out because courts concluded that the Eighth Amendment 
did not bind the states.35  Federal courts were also reluctant to intervene in 
prison-related matters based on concerns relating to federalism (in the case of 
state prisons),36 separation of powers (when dealing with federal prisons),37 or 
subverting prison discipline (in both).38  As a result, courts declined to get 
involved,39 even when prisoners alleged being “threatened, abused, [and] 
deprived of meals,”40 being “placed in a barren cell for a period of almost three 
months,”41 or being wrongfully transferred to a mental institution.42
The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and 70s brought about changes 
both in courts’ attitudes and formal doctrine.43  It also initiated a period of class 
action litigation that reformed prisons and jails.44  Continuing through the early 
1980s, this first wave of prison litigation brought major victories for prisoners, 
eliminating reliance on inmate “trusties” (prisoners entrusted with authority 
over other inmates), brutal corporal punishment, and inhumane living 
conditions.45  In the ten years following the first important prison case, prison 
 31. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 31. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2007) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . .”).  See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994) (describing § 
1983 as one of “the two most fertile sources of federal-court prisoner litigation”). 
 33. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 34. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 32, 37. 
 35. Id. at 33-34. 
 36. Id. at 34. 
 37. Id. at 34.  See also Beyond the Ken, supra note 25, at 515. 
 38. Beyond the Ken, supra note 25, at 516-17. 
 39. Id. at 508-09 & n.12. 
 40. Curtis v. Jacques, 130 F.Supp. 920, 921 (W.D. Mich. 1954) (“The law is well established 
that Federal courts do not have the power, and that it is not their function or responsibility, to 
control or regulate the management of State prisons and the treatment and disciplining of 
prisoners, or to interfere with the conduct of State prisons by State authorities.”). 
 41. Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32, 33-34 (8th Cir. 1952) (“[T]he courts have no power to 
supervise the discipline of the prisoners nor to interfere with their discipline, but only on habeas 
corpus to deliver from prison those who are illegally detained.”). 
 42. In re Taylor, 187 F.2d 852, 853 (9th Cir. 1951) (“It is not within the province of the 
courts to supervise the treatment of prisoners in federal penitentiaries.”). 
 43. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 39. 
 44. Id. at 34-46; Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail 
and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558-64 (2006) [hereinafter “Schlanger, Civil 
Rights Injunctions”]. 
 45. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 51-73, 367.  See also Schlanger, Civil Rights 
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conditions in some thirty-three jurisdictions were declared unconstitutional.46
One major aspect of the civil rights reforms was the increased 
bureaucratization of prison systems.47  Professional standards became more 
important, both as the benchmark used by courts and advocates to evaluate 
prison conditions and as a guide for prison officials seeking to avoid lawsuits.48  
“Written policies and procedures could be offered in court proceedings as 
deserving of deference, because they were at least rational . . . .”49  As a result, 
“the operations of prisons and jails throughout the country are now governed by 
a[n] amalgam of statutes, regulations, and guidelines and are subject to greater 
accountability.”50
Prison litigation also professionalized corrections management.51  Court-
enforced settlements, known as consent decrees, “professionalized and 
bureaucratized by the terms they imposed, but also by their impact on who was 
interested in becoming or qualified to become an administrator.”52  A “new 
generation” of corrections administrators emerged, with a more professional, 
“nationally oriented correctional perspective.”53
With so many state prison systems under some form of consent decree,54 a 
Injunctions, supra note 44, at 563-64 (writing that “among the areas affected were staffing, the 
amount of space per inmate, medical and mental health care, food, hygiene, sanitation, 
disciplinary procedures, conditions in disciplinary segregation, exercise, fire safety, inmate 
classification, grievance policies, race discrimination, sex discrimination, religious discrimination 
and accommodations, and disability discrimination and accommodations”). 
 46. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 39-40. 
 47. Jacobs, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement, supra note 29, at 458 (“The prisoners’ rights 
movement has contributed to the bureaucratization of the prison.”). 
 48. Susan Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, in INCARCERATING 
CRIMINALS: PRISONS AND JAILS IN SOCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 48 (Timothy J. 
Flanagan, James W. Marquart & Kenneth G. Adams eds., 1998).  See also FEELEY & RUBIN, 
supra note 21, at 162-63. 
 49. Margo Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management (in Hospitals, a 
Large Retailer, and Jails and Prisons), 2 J. OF TORT LAW 1, 46 (2008). 
 50. Feeley & Hanson, supra note 22, at 26. 
 51. Malcolm M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and the 
Bureaucratization of American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Implications, 24 PACE L. 
REV. 433, 435-36, 438 (2004). 
 52. Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note 44, at 563.  See also JAMES B. JACOBS, 
STATEVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY 73-104 (1977) (describing the “emergence of 
a professional administration” in the early 1970s at the Stateville Penitentiary in Illinois, including 
professionalization of the staff, the enactment of administrative regulations, and bureaucratization 
of the corrections agency); Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 51, at 455-65 (“[L]itigation 
promoted professionalization and facilitated opportunities for a new generation of 
administrators.”). 
 53. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 370.  See also Feeley & Hanson, supra note 22, at 
27 (discussing the role of correctional accreditation organizations); Vincent Nathan, Have the 
Courts Made A Difference in the Quality of Prison Conditions? What Have We Accomplished to 
Date?, 24 PACE L. REV. 419, 424 (2004) (“[J]udicial intervention has had a vast impact on the 
thinking and the mindset of correction administrators, as well as that of mid-level and line staff.”). 
 54. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 39-40. 
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reaction to federal court intervention followed.55  In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Supreme Court issued a number of opinions that were less prisoner-friendly,56 
and the Department of Justice under the administrations of Presidents Ronald 
Reagan and George H. W. Bush settled cases on terms unfavorable to 
prisoners.57  In the PLRA, Congress decisively constrained prisoners’ rights 
litigation58 through restrictions on prospective relief,59 consent decrees,60 pro 
se filings,61 and attorney’s fees.62  An invigorated exhaustion requirement63 
and a limitation on damages without a prior showing of a physical injury 
reduced claims further.64
By the 1990s, a consensus had emerged that prison and jail litigation was 
“moribund.”65  The conventional wisdom was that the increasingly 
conservative federal bench had restricted such litigation through judge-made 
doctrines, which were ultimately codified by the PLRA.66  In her empirical 
study of court filings, Margo Schlanger challenges this account, arguing that 
prison and jail litigation essentially remained steady through the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, before falling markedly only after Congress passed the PLRA.67  
Whichever version one accepts, the broad outline of the story remains the 
same: The long-standing “hands-off” doctrine was interrupted by a period of 
significant gains through civil rights litigation, followed by restrictions on such 
litigation.68
Meanwhile, the prison population boomed.  The number of incarcerated 
Americans increased by a factor of seven between 1970 and 2007, resulting in 
1 of every 131 Americans being incarcerated in prison or jail by mid-year 
 55. Id. at 46-50 (describing the prison reform movement as “in retreat” since 1986). 
 56. Id. at 48-49 (discussing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), which concluded that 
double-celling was not, in and of itself, an Eighth Amendment violation, and Wilson v. Seiter, 501 
U.S. 294 (1991), which held that an Eighth Amendment violation in the context of a prison riot 
required that the guard act “maliciously and sadistically”). 
 57. Id. at 49-50. 
 58. Id. at 50.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 8 (2009) (“The PLRA 
brought sweeping and unprecedented changes in the ability of prisoners to seek relief in court 
from conditions that threaten their health and safety or otherwise violate their legal rights.”). 
 59. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2008). 
 60. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1), (b)(3) (2008). 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (g) (2003). 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2009). 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2009). 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2009). 
 65. Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note 44, at 557-58, 566. 
 66. Id. at 566-67 (citing Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: 
The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 21 (1997)) (Professor Schlanger disputes the traditional account that 
the PLRA “had already limited the availability of relief to prison and jail plaintiffs and allowed 
institutional defendants various ways out of entered decrees”). 
 67. Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note 44, at 589. 
 68. See generally Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and 
the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229 (1998) (describing restrictions on prisoners’ 
rights by both the Supreme Court and Congress in the PLRA). 
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2007.69  The causes of this expansion are much debated, but probably include 
the so-called war on drugs and other law-and-order initiatives, longer prison 
terms produced by sentencing reform, and victims’ rights movements.70
During this prison boom, the racial composition of America’s prisons and 
jails changed from majority white to largely African-American and Latino.71  
Commentators have noted that this change “coincided with” the “shift toward 
constitutional deference” in prisoners’ rights doctrine.72  The racially disparate 
nature of mass incarceration leads Loic Wacquant to argue that it is better 
termed “the hyper-incarceration of one particular category: lower-class black 
men in the crumbling ghetto.”73  Some draw a direct connection between the 
end of de jure segregation and the subsequent incarceration boom, arguing that 
the prison has become a “juridical ghetto.”74
Prisons also changed in ways that were consistent with the 
bureaucratization of the system and the vast numbers of people incarcerated.  
Some systems continued to struggle with “old-fashioned” abuses, sub-standard 
conditions, and inadequate medical care.75  But in other systems, inhumanity 
evolved, in part due to the rationalization of reform efforts.76  Technologically 
advanced “supermax” prisons imposed solitary confinement77 “through the use 
 69. The Sentencing Project, News - Incarceration (2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
template/page.cfm?id=107. 
 70. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 1, at 2, 18-40. 
 71. Wacquant in RACE, INCARCERATION, supra note 9, at 60 (writing that U.S. prisoners 
were 70% white and 30% “other” at the end of World War II, and 70% African-American and 
Latino and 30% white by 2000). 
 72. Buchanan, supra note 8, at 81.  See Loury, in RACE, INCARCERATION, supra note 9, at 
13 (explaining that, beginning in the late 1960s, “opponents of the civil rights revolution sought to 
regain the upper hand by shifting to a new issue . . . a seemingly race-neutral concern over 
crime”). 
 73. Wacquant, in RACE, INCARCERATION, supra note 9, at 59. 
 74. Dolovich, Incarceration American-Style, supra note 13, at 255-56 (quoting Wacquant, 
Peculiar Institution, supra note 8, at 383-84). 
 75. See Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 4109 Before the Subcomm. 
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 17-19 
(2008) (testimony of Stephen B. Bright), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Brig 
ht080422.pdf.  See also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (concluding that restraining an 
inmate to a hitching post was an Eighth Amendment violation). 
 76. Jacobs, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement, supra note 29, at 462 (noting that “[l]ess 
punitive but possibly more intrusive mechanisms of control are now becoming more popular—
closed circuit televisions, more frequent use of tear gas, sophisticated locking systems, and unit 
management which seeks to limit inmate movement and contact”). 
 77. ALAN ELSNER, GATES OF INJUSTICE 154-55 (2004).  See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 
209 (2005) (describing “extreme isolation” in an Ohio supermax facility and concluding that 
prisoners possess a liberty interest in avoiding assignment there).  See also James Forman, Jr., 
Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 350-351 (2009) (making a connection between the abusive 
conditions at Guantanamo Bay and the development of domestic supermax prisons); Mikel-
Meredith Weidman, The Culture of Judicial Deference and the Problem of Supermax Prisons, 51 
UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1512, 1526 (describing how “the typical supermax minimizes sensory 
stimulation and human contact” and how “[t]he Supreme Court has been particularly active in 
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of electronic surveillance, specially designed cell units and blocks, and rigidly 
organized protocols for staff communication with inmates.”78  One former 
warden of a supermax has described such a facility as a “clean version of 
hell.”79  Even in traditional prisons, routine imposition of arguably abusive but 
bureaucratically rationalized practices—such as strip and body cavity 
searches—routinized degradation.80
Viewed in the long-term, the arc of this story reflects continuity as well as 
change.  Although structural prison litigation undeniably has achieved 
important victories,81 the legal regimes that govern “mass incarceration” also 
illustrate aspects of what Reva Siegel has described as “preservation through 
transformation” or “status regime . . . modernization.”82  Siegel wrote that 
formal legal doctrines sanctioning spousal abuse, such as the “right of 
chastisement,” were abandoned in the nineteenth-century; but these doctrines 
were replaced by judicial rhetoric that preserved the status quo by emphasizing 
the sanctity of the home and that declined to intervene in domestic disputes.83  
She explains that “rules and reasons” of a legal system may be modified “to 
produce a new regime” that, although “formally distinguishable from its 
predecessor,” maintains existing status hierarchies.84  In other words, when 
challenged by reform efforts, legal constructs may morph to preserve race and 
gender hierarchies.85  Siegel concludes, “If a reform movement is at all 
successful in advancing its justice claims, it will bring pressure to bear on law 
makers to rationalize status-enforcing state action in new and less socially 
developing standards of deference to constrain lower courts in prison cases”). 
 78. Simon, supra note 18, at 300-01 (citing Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of the 
Supermax: An American Solution in Search of a Problem, 1 PUNISHMENT AND SOC’Y 163 (Oct. 
1999)). 
 79. Comments of Robert Hood, former Warden at Florence, Colorado, federal 
Administrative Maximum facility, to CBS 60 Minutes, quoted in Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary 
Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 116 (2008). 
 80. See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 63, 81 (arguing that “[s]exual abuse is surreptitiously 
incorporated into one of the most habitual aspects of women’s imprisonment, the strip search”).  
My thinking on this point was affected by comments by Cynthia Chandler, Executive Director of 
Justice Now, at the Feminist Legal Theory Workshop at Emory University, February 27-28, 2009.  
Cf. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 243 (1990) (recognizing that what 
separates incarceration from corporal punishment “is not a matter of the intrinsic levels of pain 
and brutality involved,” but rather “the form which that violence takes, and the extent to which it 
impinges on public sensibilities”). 
 81. Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note 44, at 563-64. 
 82. Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE 
L.J. 2117, 2119-20 (1996).  See also Buchanan, supra note 8, at 48-49 (applying Siegel’s theory 
of status regime modernization in the context of legal regimes countenancing sexual abuse of 
incarcerated women of color). 
 83. Siegel, supra note 82, at 2153 (“As courts addressed the regulation of marital violence in 
the wake of chastisement’s demise, judges raised concerns about invading the privacy of the 
marriage relationship . . . .”). 
 84. Id. at 2180. 
 85. Id. 
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controversial terms.”86
The concept of status regime modernization operates on a number of 
levels in the story of prison reform.  First, mass incarceration and the legal 
regimes that govern it perpetuate status hierarchies of race, class, and gender 
that previously were supported by other social and legal institutions.87  On 
another level, status regime modernization explains the story of prison reform 
over the last forty years; following a brief period of gains, new legal strictures 
have pushed us back in the direction of a “hands-off” approach.88  Although 
courts may have rejected the formal doctrines underpinning the “hands-off” 
posture, deference to corrections officials and to their regulations has become 
the most recent incarnation of the “hands-off” policy.89  Because of the racially 
disparate impact of mass incarceration, this updated “hands-off” policy now 
maintains status regimes of race and class. 
B.  Deference 
Supreme Court case law defers to corrections officials and their policies; 
indeed, the Court treats prison and jail regulations as an undifferentiated 
monolith, according them deference without asking how they are formulated.90  
 86. Id. at 2120. 
 87. See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 26 (identifying “the historical links between U.S. slavery and 
the early penitentiary system”); Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration, supra note 8; 
Wacquant, Peculiar Institution, supra note 8; Loury, in RACE, INCARCERATION, supra note 9, at 
36-37.  See also Buchanan, supra note 8, at 49-50 (“The rationales, rules and results of 
contemporary prison law impunity evoke women’s exposure to sexual and gender violence under 
19th century status regimes that contemporary courts and legislatures have long purported to 
reject.”). 
 88. Elizabeth Budnitz, Not a Part of Her Sentence: Applying the Supreme Court’s Johnson 
v. California to Prison Abortion Policies, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1291, 1305 (2006) (concluding that 
Turner produced “a return to the earlier hands-off doctrine that paid vast deference to prison 
officials in determining prison policy”); Cheryl Dunn Giles, Turner v. Safley and Its Progeny: A 
Gradual Retreat to the “Hands-Off Doctrine?”, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 220 (1993) (arguing six 
years after Turner that the Supreme Court’s lax application of the standard was “a step backwards 
toward the historical ‘hands-off’ approach”). 
 89. At various junctures beginning in the late 1970s, and continuing through the 1990s, 
commentators have claimed that successive, increasingly harsh restrictions on prisoners’ 
substantive or procedural rights constitute a “return to” or a “new” “hands-off” doctrine.  See 
Budnitz, supra note 88; Giles, supra note 88.  See also Mark Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and 
Due Deference: The New Hands Off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2 
(1979) (explaining how courts replaced the “hands-off” doctrine with limitations on prisoners’ 
substantive rights); Robbins, supra note 29, at 215 (arguing that Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 
(1979), “reviv[ed] many aspects of the hands-off doctrine” through “judicial deference” to 
corrections authorities, signaling the “emergence of a new hands-off approach”). 
 90. Cf. Lorijean Golichowski Dei, The New Standard of Review for Prisoners’ Rights: A 
“Turner” for the Worse?, 33 VILL. L. REV. 393, 436 (1988) (noting that “the standard’s heavy 
emphasis on deference robs it of most of its bite” and that it is “to be applied uniformly to the 
whole range of challenges”); Richard H. Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1301-03 (2006) (noting that the Supreme Court 
“has mandated a relaxed application even of this loose [Turner] standard” and that this 
demonstrates a sense that judges are ill-suited to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of prison 
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In its 1987 decision in Turner v. Safley,91 the Supreme Court articulated what is 
by now its familiar test for determining when a prison regulation that impinges 
on prisoners’ constitutional rights passes muster.  While courts rigorously 
scrutinize regulations that may implicate constitutional rights in other 
administrative law areas,92 in the prison context, courts defer even to 
regulations that impinge on constitutional rights. 
Writing for the Court in Turner, Justice O’Connor surveyed prior case law 
regarding restrictions on prison unions, face-to-face visits with the media, and 
receipt of hardback books.93  She wrote that “[p]rison walls do not form a 
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”94  
Nonetheless, she also recognized that “[r]unning a prison is an inordinately 
difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and 
executive branches of government.”95  Particularly when a state prison system 
is involved, she wrote, “federal courts have . . . additional reason to accord 
deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”96
Justice O’Connor concluded that “when a prison regulation impinges on 
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related 
to legitimate penological interests.”97  She then set out the four factor test that 
has governed so much of prison litigation for the last twenty years: (1) whether 
there is a “valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the 
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;” (2) “whether there 
[are] alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison 
inmates;” (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right 
will have on guards and other inmates;” and (4) “whether there are ‘ready 
alternatives’ to the regulation.”98  Applying this test in Turner itself, the Court 
struck down restrictions on inmate marriage,99 describing the social 
significance of marriage.100  However, Turner upheld restrictions on inmate-to-
litigation in the aggregate); James E. Robertson, The Majority Opinion as the Social Construction 
of Reality: The Supreme Court and Prison Rules, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 161 (2000) [hereinafter 
“Robertson, The Majority Opinion”] (discussing the Turner test and arguing that “the Supreme 
Court has constructed as social reality a set of assumptions about imprisonment that renders 
inmates unworthy of meaningful constitutional safeguards”); James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist 
Court and the “Turnerization” of Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 97, 121-22 (2006) 
[hereinafter “Robertson, The Rehnquist Court”]. 
 91. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78. 
 92. See infra note 278. 
 93. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85-90. 
 94. Id. at 84. 
 95. Id. at 85. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 89. 
 98. Id. at 89-91. 
 99. Id. at 94. 
 100. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 417 (Conn. 2008) (relying on 
Turner to describe the social significance of marriage). 
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inmate correspondence, citing security concerns.101
The Turner test—the primary federal constitutional standard associated 
with challenges to prison and jail regulations—thus emphasizes deference to 
prison officials and the relative technical and administrative expertise of 
corrections authorities.  It also acknowledges the “intractable” problems of 
prison administration and the comity concerns associated with federal judicial 
intervention in state court systems.102  The Court has applied Turner in a way 
that defers to corrections regulations as well; apart from overriding the 
restriction on inmate marriage in Turner itself, the Supreme Court has never 
invalidated a prison regulation analyzed under the test.103
Significantly, the Turner test does not require courts to differentiate 
among types of prison and jail regulations, policies, and rules, creating a one-
size-fits-all approach.  As a result, lower courts apply Turner both in cases 
involving corrections regulations promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking104 and in cases involving far more informal policies or practices.105  
For example, in a Fourth Circuit case applying Turner to uphold a “policy” of 
single-celling all gay male prisoners, the corrections “policy” at issue was the 
decision of a sergeant who reportedly said, “as long as I please my supervisor, 
what I say goes and whether or not it’s right, it’s non-grievable.”106
One area, however, in which the Court has declined to apply Turner 
 101. 482 U.S. at 91-93. 
 102. Id. at 84-85. 
 103. See, e.g., Banks v. Beard, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (upholding restriction on newspapers and 
magazines); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (upholding restrictions on visitation); Shaw 
v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001) (upholding prohibition on inmate-to-inmate correspondence in 
which one prisoner gives legal advice to another); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) 
(upholding policy regarding procedure for forcible medication of inmates); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 
490 U.S. 401 (1989) (upholding restrictions on certain publications); O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 
342 (1987) (upholding prison work detail regulations that resulted in Muslim inmates missing 
Jumu’ah services).  In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361-63 (1996), a case involving the standard 
for access to courts claims, the majority emphasized that the remedial order entered by the district 
court was inconsistent with the “deferential standard” of Turner.  See also Robertson, The 
Rehnquist Court, supra note 90, at 107-08 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court had 
applied Turner up to that time).  Lower courts also apply Turner deferentially.  See Weidman, 
supra note 77, at 1521 (“Lower courts’ internalization and extension of the Supreme Court’s 
mandates mark the complete transformation of the hands-off tradition into a full-blown culture of 
judicial deference.”). 
 104. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 129 (2003) (upholding restrictions on visitation 
imposed by Michigan Administrative Code, MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 791.6609 (1980)). 
 105. See Von Minden v. Jankowski, 268 Fed. App’x 352 (5th Cir. 2008) (upholding under 
Turner a Washington County, Texas, county jail visitation rule prohibiting a father from visiting 
his son because the father had been detained pretrial on a marijuana possession charge for one day 
within the previous six months); Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 734 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying 
Turner to uphold regional jail policy of single-celling all gay male prisoners); Bowman v. 
Beasley, 8 Fed. App’x 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding under Turner a South Carolina 
Department of Corrections practice of segregating all HIV+ prisoners by moving them to a 
particular facility). 
 106. Brief of Appellant at *7, Veney v. Wyche, 2001 WL 3438545 (4th Cir. Dec. 10, 2001) 
(No. 01-6603). 
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deference is in examining an express racial categorization.107  When confronted 
with a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) 
unwritten policy of racially segregating incoming prisoners on a temporary 
basis, the Court remanded for the lower court to apply strict scrutiny, the 
normal standard of review for race-based classifications.108  It explained, 
“[P]ublic respect for our system of justice is undermined when the system 
discriminates based on race.”109
Prison grievance policies, procedures by which prisoners can complain 
about problems to prison administrators, are accorded even greater deference 
than other rules.  The PLRA requires that prisoners “exhaust” all available 
remedies before bringing federal claims to court.110  In a pair of decisions 
involving the PLRA exhaustion requirement, the Court has accorded prison and 
jail grievance policies great weight in determining which prisoners’ claims will 
be heard.  In Woodford v. Ngo,111 the Supreme Court considered the effect of 
procedural error on the PLRA requirement that prisoners exhaust all available 
administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit.112  It concluded that the PLRA 
requires “proper exhaustion.”113  This requirement has significant 
consequences: Prisoners who miss a filing deadline or otherwise fail to comply 
with a procedural requirement in the prison grievance process might be forever 
barred from bringing their claim to court.114
In reaching its conclusion, the Court examined analogous concepts in 
administrative law and concluded that the PLRA “uses the term ‘exhausted’ to 
mean what the term means in administrative law.”115  The Woodford Court 
emphasized the purposes of administrative exhaustion: “Proper exhaustion 
demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural 
rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing 
 107. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (concluding that strict scrutiny should be 
applied to examine an unwritten California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation policy 
segregating incoming inmates by race). 
 108. Id. at 509-10. 
 109. Id. at 511.  Perhaps the express racial categorization in Johnson came too close to 
making manifest the racial hierarchies perpetuated in the criminal justice system, in a way that 
facially neutral prison regulations do not.  Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) 
(disparate impact based on facially neutral policies was insufficient to demonstrate an equal 
protection violation). 
 110. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2009) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison 
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any 
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”). 
 111. 548 U.S. 81 (2006). 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2009). 
 113. 548 U.S. at 93. 
 114. Kermit Roosevelt, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The 
Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1810-13 (2003); Margo Schlanger & 
Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails & Prisons: The Case for Amending 
the PLRA, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139 (2009). 
 115. 548 U.S. at 93. 
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some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”116  Thus, Woodford 
ostensibly treated prison grievance policies like other agencies’ procedural 
rules even though prison policies often determine prisoners’ ability to seek 
redress for constitutional violations.117
However, in his concurrence in Woodford, Justice Breyer, an 
administrative law scholar, suggested that “administrative law . . . contains well 
established exceptions to exhaustion,” and these might apply in the PLRA 
context as well.118  Although there is some tension between Justice Breyer’s 
suggestion and other Supreme Court PLRA exhaustion precedent,119 his 
concurrence reminds us that if administrative law principles are going to be 
applied in the prison context, they should not be imported selectively. 
In a follow-on case the next year, Jones v. Bock, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define 
the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”120  Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts 
included language seemingly refuting the notion that the Court was returning to 
a “hands-off” posture.  “Our legal system,” he wrote, “remains committed to 
guaranteeing that prisoner claims of illegal conduct by their custodians are 
fairly handled according to law.”121
In short, while asserting that courts remain open to prisoners’ 
constitutional claims, the Supreme Court has accorded corrections officials 
significant leeway, even when constitutional rights are implicated.122  Even 
while deferring to corrections rules, most Supreme Court case law does not 
differentiate among types of prison and jail regulations and policies.  In fact, 
 116. Id. at 90-91. 
 117. See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE, § 15.5, at 331 (4th ed. 2002) (describing the “constitutional right exception” to the 
exhaustion doctrine in non-PLRA administrative law contexts). 
 118. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 103-04 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting 
exceptions to administrative exhaustion requirements for constitutional claims: futility, hardship, 
and inadequate or unavailable administrative remedies). 
 119. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (exhaustion required for “all inmate suits 
about prison life”); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (PLRA exhaustion required 
regardless of “the relief offered through administrative procedures”). 
 120. 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). 
 121. Id. at 203. 
 122. Another major obstacle to prisoners’ rights suits is the high standard of liability for 
Eighth Amendment violations—the “deliberate indifference” standard.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for 
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards 
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”).  Prison policies are a focus of litigation in the 
Eighth Amendment context as well, particularly in the area of supervisory liability.  See 
Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431 (2d Cir. 2003) ( holding that, in the Second Circuit, 
supervisory liability may be demonstrated by: “(1) actual direct participation in the constitutional 
violation, (2) failure to remedy a wrong after being informed through a report or appeal, (3) 
creation of a policy or custom that sanctioned conduct amounting to a constitutional violation, or 
allowing such a policy or custom to continue, (4) grossly negligent supervision of subordinates 
who committed a violation, or (5) failure to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts 
were occurring”). 
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corrections rules originate from a wide range of administrative and legal 
processes representing varying degrees of transparency and accountability.  The 
next section describes how corrections regulations are often exempt from 
normal rulemaking procedures. 
II.  REGULATING CORRECTIONS 
This Section surveys state administrative procedure act provisions 
regarding corrections policies123 and then discusses some of the practical 
implications of corrections policies for prisoners, their families, and free 
communities. 
A.  Survey of Administrative Procedure Acts 
State prisoners are the focus of this Article because they are by far the 
most numerous,124 but it is useful to examine the regulation of federal prisons 
as a point of comparison.  The U.S. Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) is subject to the 
rulemaking requirements of the federal Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”).125  “Informal” notice-and-comment rulemaking under the federal 
 123. Private prisons may be subject to department of corrections regulations through contract 
provisions, Nichols v. TransCor America, No. M2001-01889-COA-R9-CV, 2002 WL 1364059, at 
*8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (noting provisions of contract between State of Florida and TransCor 
stating that inmates who are transported by contractor shall be treated in accordance with the 
Department of Correction’s rules and regulations), but in other jurisdictions, they are not subject 
to state corrections regulations, Moore v. Gaither, 767 A.2d 278, 286-87 (D.C. 2001) (private 
Correctional Treatment Facility not subject to Lorton Regulations Approval Act governing 
District of Columbia prisons).  Although regulation of private prisons is beyond the scope of this 
Article, commentators have urged additional administrative law and regulatory controls.  See 
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative Law, 10 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 126, 130-31 (2003) [hereinafter “Aman, Globalization”] 
(arguing that prison privatization creates a “democracy deficit” that can be bridged in part through 
extension of administrative law “values” to new “public/private arrangements”); Alfred C. Aman, 
Jr., Privatization, Prisons, Democracy, and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the Province of 
Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511, 516 (arguing that “delegations of 
public functions to private bodies,” such as private prisons, “is a crucial area for administrative 
law reform and an important way of guarding against human rights violations”); Jack Beermann, 
The Reach of Administrative Law in the United States, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 171, 191-93 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997) (arguing that private prisons companies should be 
considered “state actors” subject to administrative law strictures); Sharon Dolovich, State 
Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 439, 515 (2005) (“There ought to be benchmark 
standards of quality and humanity that apply to all prisons, set by state departments of corrections 
themselves—or if this arrangement would create too great a conflict of interest, then by an 
independent body.”). 
 124. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that at year-end 2007, 1.4 million people were 
incarcerated in state prisons (not including jails), while only 201,142 prisoners were in federal 
jurisdiction.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONS STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.g 
ov/bjs/correct.htm#findings (last visited Oct. 30, 2009). 
 125. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).  An amicus brief filed in a 2001 U.S. Supreme Court case 
involving a BOP regulation explained, “Certain BOP actions relating to determinations for 
individual prisoners are exempt from the APA’s requirements, but the exemption does not extend 
to the BOP’s rule-making activities.”  Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of 
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APA essentially requires that the agency provide notice of the proposed rule, 
provide interested parties with an opportunity for comment, and explain the 
reasons behind the choices it made in the final version.126  A federal court 
reviewing BOP regulations under the APA can strike down prison rules if they 
are “arbitrary and capricious,” or remand for a further statement of reasoning if 
the prison authority failed to provide an adequate rationale.127
Like other federal agencies, however, the BOP need not comply with 
APA rulemaking procedures when it issues “interpretive rules, general 
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice.”128  These take the form of Program Statements and Institutional 
Supplements.129  However, under the federal APA, “interpretive” rules and 
statements of policy are not meant to bind parties or affect substantive rights.130  
Criminal Defense Lawyers, Families Against Mandatory Minimums Foundation, and the 
Association of Federal Defenders in Support of Petitioner Christopher A. Lopez at 20, Lopez v. 
Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001) (No. 99-7504), 2000 WL 890320 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3625 (2008) as 
“removing applicability of certain sections of the APA, but not Section 553, which establishes 
rule-making requirements”).  18 U.S.C. § 3625 states that “[t]he provisions of sections 554 and 
555 [adjudication and ancillary proceedings] and 701 through 706 of title 5, United States Code, 
do not apply to the making of any determination, decision, or order under this subchapter.”  Cf. 
Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 244 n.6 (2001) (addressing whether BOP possessed discretion to 
promulgate regulation barring felons convicted of using a firearm from early release, although 
declining to address the question of whether BOP had complied with APA).  A 1977 decision of 
the 9th Circuit, Clardy v. Levi, 545 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1977), held that BOP disciplinary hearings 
were not subject to the APA, creating a circuit split on whether the BOP was bound by the APA.  
See also White v. Henman, 977 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1992).  More recent case law accepts that BOP 
rule-making, at least, as distinct from individual adjudication, is subject to the APA.  See Todd 
Bussert, Peter Goldberger & Mary Price, New Time Limits on Federal Halfway Houses, 21 A.B.A. 
SEC. CRIM. JUST. 2 (Spring 2006) (describing litigation about whether the BOP had complied with 
the APA in changing rules regarding halfway house placement). 
 126. Steven Crowley, Making Rules: An Introduction, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1512-13 
(1995) (describing informal rulemaking and contrasting it with “formal” rulemaking under the 
federal APA, which is required only in limited circumstances, and which includes a hearing and 
the taking of testimony).  Compare Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(concluding that BOP regulation regarding early release of prisoners who complete residential 
substance abuse program violated APA), with Gatewood v. Outlaw, 560 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(concluding that BOP rule passed muster under the APA).  See also Grier v. Hood, 46 Fed. App’x 
433, 440 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is apparent that the procedures utilized to adopt the [BOP] 
regulation did not comply with the APA.”). 
 127. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2006); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.8, at 496-97.  See 
also Gatewood, 560 F.3d at 846-48; Alnoubani v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 306 Fed. App’x 309 
(7th Cir. 2009) (Under the APA, agency action can be reviewed to determine if it is arbitrary or 
capricious or if the agency fails to state a rationale.); Arrington, 516 F.3d at 1111-12. 
 128. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006).  The federal APA also has substantive exemptions for 
rules pertaining to “military or foreign affairs,” for matters “relating to agency management or 
personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts,” and for “good cause,” 5 
U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1)-(2), (b)(B), (d)(3) (2006), although these exceptions have been criticized.  See 
1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.10, at 503-06. 
 129. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Policy and Forms, http://www.bop.gov/policy/index.jsp 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2009).  See also Complaint, Benkahla v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, (S.D. Ind. 
June 18, 2009) (No. 2:09-cv-00025). 
 130. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, §§ 6.3-6.4 at 316-49; Robert A. Anthony, 
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Thus, whether a BOP regulation is “interpretive or substantive”—whether it is 
an internal guideline clarifying a regulation or a true regulation—is a question 
often litigated by federal prisoners.131
State administrative law regimes vary.132  In some seventeen 
jurisdictions—including, inter alia, New York, Illinois, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin—the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) is bound by the 
provisions of the state administrative procedure act, including notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures,133 for at least the most formal tier of rules 
Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal 
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1315 (1992) (arguing that policy 
statements and interpretive rules should not be used to bind the public if they are not submitted to 
notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 131. A federal prisoner confined in a highly restrictive “Communication Management Unit” 
(CMU) reserved for suspected terrorists recently filed suit alleging that the BOP promulgated 
substantive rules regarding placement in the CMUs through “Institutional Supplements,” thereby 
circumventing the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA.  Complaint, Benkahla v. Fed. 
Bureau of Prisons, (S.D. Ind. June 18, 2009) (No. 2:09-cv-00025).  See also Ojeda v. Fed. Bureau 
of Prisons, 225 Fed. App’x 285, 286 (5th Cir. 2007) (Change in the rule of an agency was 
discretionary and exempt from notice-and-comment requirements of the APA.); Morrison v. 
Woodring, 191 Fed. App’x 606 (9th Cir. 2006) (Security classifications are not subject to APA 
rulemaking procedures); Williams v. Van Buren, 117 Fed. App’x 985, 987 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(Compassionate release rule “is an interpretive rule that is not subject to the ‘notice and comment’ 
requirements of the APA”); Sample v. Watts, 100 Fed. App’x 317 (5th Cir. 2004) (Because 
program statement “did not contradict or alter an existing rule of longstanding policy or practice, . 
. . the Administrative Procedures Act’s notice and comment requirements do not apply.”); Hill v. 
Pugh, 75 Fed. App’x 715 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Bureau of Prisons’ program statements . . . are 
‘internal agency guidelines’ that are not ‘subject to the rigors of the [APA], including public 
notice and comment.’”); Gunderson v. Hood, 268 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (Because the BOP 
statement “did no more than ‘clarify or explain existing law,’ it was interpretive and thus not 
subject to the rigors of the APA.”).  See generally Yana Dobkin, Cabining the Discretion of the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Federal Courts: Interpretive Rules, Statutory Interpretation, 
and the Debate Over Community Confinement Centers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 171, 188-98, 213 
(2005) (describing litigation about whether changes to BOP halfway house placement rules were 
interpretive or substantive; noting that BOP rule-change in the form of a “[m]emorandum” was 
really a substantive rule that “offer[ed] no meaningful opportunity for input”). 
 132. Each state’s administrative procedure act rulemaking provisions regarding corrections, if 
any, are set out in a chart in the Appendix.  This Article focuses on rulemaking procedures under 
state administrative procedure acts.  There are also issues regarding whether certain hearings in 
prison settings are “contested cases” for which judicial review is available.  See, e.g., Clinton v. 
Bonds, 816 S.W.2d 169 (Ark. 1991) (Inmates have a right to judicial review of constitutional 
questions, even if the state Administrative Procedure Act exempts prison disciplinary procedures 
from the definition of “contested cases.”); Walen v. Dep’t of Corr., 505 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. 1993) 
(concluding that prison disciplinary hearings fall within definition of “contested case” for the 
purpose of FOIA, although such proceedings are exempted from some provisions of the state 
Administrative Procedure Act); Al-Shabazz v. State, 527 S.E.2d 742 (S.C. 2000).  These questions 
are beyond the scope of this article. 
 133. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.280.030, 33.30.021 (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-
1603(d)(2) (Supp. 2009); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 850.120(c)-(d) (2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 
11-8-2-5(b)(1) (West 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 197.020, 196.035 (LexisNexis 1999); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 1402 (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 30A, § 1A (West 2001); 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-901 to -920 (2008); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:1-1.5(a) (2009); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 64-13-10(2) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 831(a) (2003).  See also Abdullah v. 
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deemed “regulations.”  Twenty-eight U.S. jurisdictions expressly exempt some 
rules affecting prisoners from the state administrative procedure act in whole or 
in part,134 and about a half-dozen more have interpreted general exemptions to 
their state administrative procedure act to apply to some rules affecting 
prisoners.135  Connecticut has done some of both.136
These types of exemptions follow from revisions of the Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act.  For instance, the 1961 Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act included an exemption to rulemaking procedures 
for regulations pertaining only to internal management of the agency, which 
was adopted by many jurisdictions.137  The 1981 revision to the Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act not only included an exemption for “procedural 
requirements rules concerning only internal management that do not 
substantially affect procedural or substantive rights of any segment of the 
Gunter, 497 N.W.2d 12, 860 (Neb. 1993); Jones v. Smith, 478 N.E.2d 191, 192-193 (N.Y. 1985); 
Weaver v. Dep’t of Corr., 720 A.2d 178 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998); Parker v. Gorczyk, 787 A.2d 
494 (Vt. 2001); State ex rel. Clifton v. Young, 394 N.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986); 
Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Policy Directive 01.04.110 (July 01, 2007), available at http://www.michiga 
n.gov/documents/corrections/01_04_110_199868_7.pdf; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:1-1.5(a) 
(2009); Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., Notice Procedure, 5120: 2-1-01 (July 01, 2002) 
(referencing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03 (LexisNexis 2007)), available at http://www.drc.ohi 
o.gov/web/administrative_rules/documents/2-1-01.pdf; Oregon Dep’t of Corr., Rule No. 291-001-
0020 (July 20, 2007), available at http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rules/OARS_200/OAR_291/291_0 
01.html. 
 134. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-22-3(9)(g)(1) (LexisNexis 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
41-1005(A)(7) (2004); CAL. PENAL CODE § 5058(c) (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-1-111 
(2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-78a (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4322(d) 
(2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-2(1) (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-212 (1997); IOWA ADMIN. 
CODE r. 201-10.2(17A) (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-415(f) (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 30A, § 1A (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.03(b)(1) (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
25-43-1.102(i)(ii)(6) (West 2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 536.010(6)(k) (West 2008); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 2-4-102(2)(a)(ii) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233B.039(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2007); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-H:8 (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-2 (LexisNexis 
2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(d)(6) (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01(11)(f) (1991); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 250.4(A)(10) (West Supp. 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-10 (2005); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-1(8)(g) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(10)(G) (2005); TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.226 (Vernon 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4002(B)(9)-(10) (2008); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.05.030(c) (West 2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-1-3(c) 
(LexisNexis 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-105(a) (2009). 
 135. See Pierce v. Lantz, 965 A.2d 576, 579-81 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009); Caldwell v. State, 821 
So.2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Tai v. Chung, 570 P.2d 563 (Haw. 1977); Peterson v. 
Michael, 960 So.2d 1260 (La. Ct. App. 2007); Massey v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. 
Servs., 886 A.2d 585, 601 (Md. 2005); Johnson v. State, No. 99-1007, 2002 WL 1803931 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. 2002). 
 136. Connecticut expressly exempts certain regulations from notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-78a (West 2006), and a recent Connecticut decision 
has interpreted Connecticut law to exempt other rules, see Pierce v. Lantz, 965 A.2d 576, 579-81 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (concluding that DOC regulations regarding censorship of “sexually 
explicit materials and compact discs with parental advisory stickers” and price mark-up on items 
in prison commissary were not “rules” within the meaning of section 4-166 (13) of the 
Connecticut Statute). 
 137. Massey, 886 A.2d at 598. 
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public,” but also expressly excluded from rulemaking requirements rules 
“concerning only inmates of a correctional or detention facility.”138
Among jurisdictions with a general state administrative procedure act 
exemption for rules regarding “internal management” of an agency, courts have 
differed in their interpretation of the provision.  Courts in Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, and Tennessee have read such exemptions to exclude at least some 
prison regulations from notice-and-comment requirements.139  The New York 
Court of Appeals took a different approach, writing in Jones v. Smith that 
prisoners are, in fact, the members of the “general public” affected by the 
department action.140  The Michigan Supreme Court has agreed with the New 
York court, rejecting the argument that rules governing prisoners did not affect 
the general public.  The Michigan Court wrote that “this belief seems to 
overlook the obvious public concern of humanitarian and civil rights groups 
[and] completely overlooks the concern of the Legislature.”141
Maryland’s highest court has twice interpreted an exemption for rules 
concerning only “internal management” that do not “affect directly the rights of 
the public or the procedures available to the public.”142  In both cases, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that the exemption did not apply to 
certain corrections regulations.  In 2005, in Massey v. Secretary, Department of 
Public Safety and Correctional Services, the court concluded that this 
exemption did not apply to prison disciplinary regulations, which affect 
“fundamental rights.”143  Nonetheless, Massey stated that many other prison 
rules were not subject to rule-making requirements.  “[T]he myriad of rules 
governing the details of prison life—what inmates may wear, what they may or 
may not keep in their cells or on their persons, the rules governing security, 
sanitation, hygiene, phone calls, mail, and visits,” the court wrote—need not be 
 138. Id. at 599.  See also ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 
3.3.5, at 94-95 (1986) (discussing section 3-116 of 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure 
Act).  As this article was being written, the State Administrative Procedure Act Study Committee 
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was discussing a revised 
Model State Administrative Procedure Act.  Its definition of “Rule” exempts internal policies in a 
number of ways but contains no specific exemption for rules affecting prisoners.  As of May 18, 
2009, section 102(27) of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
Model State Administrative Procedure Act discussion draft provides that the term “Rule” does not 
include, inter alia, “(A) statements concerning only the internal management of an agency and not 
affecting private rights or procedures available to the public.”  Revised Model State Admin. 
Procedure Act § 102(27) (Proposed Draft 2009), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/msap 
a/2009mar_clean.htm. 
 139. See, e.g., Pierce v. Lantz, 965 A.2d 576, 579-81 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009); Johnson v. State, 
No. 99-1007, 2002 WL 1803931 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2002); Abdur’rahma v. Bredsen, 181 S.W.3d 292 
(Tenn. 2005). 
 140. Jones v. Smith, 478 N.E.2d 191, 192-93 (N.Y. 1985). 
 141. Martin v. Dep’t of Corr., 384 N.W.2d 392, 396 (Mich. 1986). 
 142. MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 2-109(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2008). MD. CODE ANN., 
STATE GOV’T § 10-101(g)(2)(i)(2) (LexisNexis 2004). 
 143. Massey v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 886 A.2d 585, 598 (Md. 2005). 
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adopted as regulations.144  Two years later, in Evans v. State, the court 
concluded that the exemption did not apply to lethal injection protocols, which 
affect not only the condemned but also correctional personnel and witnesses to 
the execution.145
In its opinion interpreting the “internal management” exception, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals wrote that “there has been surprisingly little 
comment on the general meaning and scope of that exemption.”146  It relied 
heavily on the few authorities to address the question, particularly state 
administrative law expert Arthur Bonfield, who commented that “agencies 
could too easily subvert public rulemaking requirements if they could avoid 
those procedures for anything they called an internal directive to staff.”147  
Bonfield characterized such exceptions as “very narrowly drawn” and meant 
“to assure that matters of internal agency management that are purely of 
concern to the agency and its staff are effectively excluded from normal rule-
making . . . requirements.”148  The policies that fell within this exemption, he 
wrote, were those that “face inwards.”149
Litigation challenging lethal injection protocols in other states, including 
California, also has turned on the interpretation of specific state administrative 
procedure act exemptions.  Like the Maryland case, the California litigation 
focused on whether lethal injection protocols were exempt as “internal” 
management regulations, or whether they had an effect “beyond [the prison’s] 
walls” and thus were subject to the state Administrative Procedure Act.150  The 
First District of the California Courts of Appeal concluded that the lethal 
injection protocol was subject to the state Administrative Procedure Act.151  
Courts in other states have reached different conclusions, reasoning that lethal 
injection protocols concern only inmates of a correctional facility, and thus fall 
within exceptions for rules regarding “internal management.”152
 144. Id. at 602. 
 145. Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25, 80 (Md. 2007). 
 146. Massey, 886 A.2d at 598. 
 147. Id. at 599 (quoting Arthur Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act: 
Background, Construction, Applicability, Public Access to Agency Law, the Rulemaking Process, 
60 IOWA L. REV. 61, 79 (1975)) (emphasis omitted). 
 148. Id. (quoting BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 6.17.02, at 402) (emphasis omitted). 
 149. Id. (quoting Bonfield, supra note 147, at 834). 
 150. Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 151. Id. See also Bowling et al. v. Kentucky Dept. of Corr., 2007-SC-000021-MR (Nov. 25, 
2009) (concluding that a lethal injection protocol was subject to Kentucky Administrative 
Procedure Act). 
 152. See, e.g., Middleton v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 278 S.W.3d 193 (Mo. 2009) (concluding that 
lethal injection protocol was not a “rule” within the meaning of the Missouri Administrative 
Procedure Act because it fell within exemption for “a statement concerning only inmates of an 
institution under the control of the department of corrections”); Abdur’rahma v. Bredesen, 181 
S.W.3d 292 (Tenn. 2005) (Lethal injection protocol is not a “rule” under the UAPA because the 
UAPA does not include “internal management of state government” or “statements concerning 
inmates of a correctional facility.”); Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d 415, 432-33 (Va. 2008) 
(Virginia execution procedures were not subject to the state Administrative Procedure Act because 
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Even if a state administrative procedure act ostensibly requires a 
corrections authority to make regulations pursuant to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, there are still many corrections rules and policies promulgated 
outside of administrative law strictures that affect prisoners’ substantive rights, 
as well as broader communities.153  California permits “local” rules affecting 
only a single institution to be promulgated outside of notice-and-comment 
procedures.154  Feeley and Swearingen have noted that California may overuse 
its “local rules” process,155 producing negative consequences.  For example, 
confusion can result when a prisoner is transferred and medical or psychiatric 
care practices vary between facilities.156
Other jurisdictions with multiple tiers of rule-making also use informal 
processes heavily.  While the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) 
must promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to its state administrative 
procedure act,157 its policy directives are promulgated more informally (and 
there are about 189 policy directives on the MDOC web site).  Ohio also has 
two tiers of regulations—administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to 
the state administrative code158 and policy directives approved by the 
Commissioner.159  The policy directives cover a wide range of critical areas, 
including medical and mental health care, inmate discipline, responding to 
inmate sexual assaults, religious practice, visitation, and mail.160  In Alaska as 
well, regulations are promulgated pursuant to the procedures of the Alaska 
Administrative Procedure Act,161 but the Commissioner is also authorized to 
it exempts “actions of agencies” relating to “inmates or prisoners.”).  See also Ark. Dep’t of Corr. 
v. Williams, No. 08-1031 (Ark. Oct. 29, 2009) (noting that the Arkansas legislature amended 
section 5-4-617 of the Arkansas Code to exempt lethal injection protocols from the state 
Administrative Procedure Act); Jackson v. Danberg, C.A. No. 07M-09-141 RRC, 2008 WL 
1850585 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008) (lethal injection protocol exempt from Administrative Procedure 
Act). 
 153. See Anthony, supra note 130, at 1315 (arguing that “[e]xcept to the extent that they 
interpret specific statutory or regulatory language . . . nonlegislative rules like policy statements, 
guidances, manuals and memoranda should not be used to bind the public,” because they are not 
subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking) (emphasis omitted). 
 154. Malcolm M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, Reducing Litigation Exposure: An Evaluation 
of How the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Responds to Court Orders 
and Anticipates Future Legal Issues 31-35 (June 25, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 34. 
 157. See Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Policy Directive 01.04.110 (July 01, 2007), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/01_04_110_199868_7.pdf. 
 158. See Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., Notice Procedure, 5120: 2-1-01 (July 01, 2002) 
(referencing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03 (LexisNexis 2007)), available at 
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/administrative_rules/documents/2-1-01.pdf. 
 159. See Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., Department Directives, No. 01-COM-01 (Jan. 26, 
2008), available at http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/drc_policies/documents/01-COM-01.pdf. 
 160. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., Policies, http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/drc_policies/drc 
_policies.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2009). 
 161. ALASKA STAT. § 44.28.030 (2008) (“The commissioner may adopt regulations to carry 
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promulgate a policy manual,162 which deals with issues including relations 
between the corrections department and tribal governments.163
Another important area of corrections policy-making, both beyond the 
scope of extended discussion in this Article and not typically subject to state 
administrative procedure act rulemaking strictures, is policy-making in local 
jails.  The Urban Institute reports that “over nine million people pass through 
America’s local jails each year.”164  Many of these facilities are run by cities, 
counties, and local sheriffs.  In some jurisdictions, state corrections 
departments promulgate administrative regulations setting standards for local 
jails (particularly those holding state inmates).165  In other jurisdictions, jail 
policies are promulgated far more informally.166  Although this Article does not 
capture this area of informal policy-making, it warrants further consideration. 
While this Article focuses on state administrative rule-making provisions, 
the availability of judicial review of corrections rules, policies, and actions 
under state administrative procedure acts is also consequential, if for no other 
reason than to ensure that the rulemaking process is legitimate.167  A 
comprehensive discussion of state administrative procedure act provisions for 
judicial review of corrections policies is beyond the scope of this Article; this is 
a potential area for future research.168
out or assist in carrying out the powers and duties of the department.”); §§ 44.62.010-.630 
(describing notice-and-comment rulemaking process); § 44.62.640 (a)(3) (defines “regulation”). 
 162. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 05.155(a) (2004) (“The department will maintain a 
manual comprised of policies and procedures established by the commissioner to interpret and 
implement relevant sections of the Alaska Statutes and 22 AAC.”).  See Mathis v. Sauser, 942 
P.2d 1117, 1123 nn.12-13 (Alaska 1997) (concluding that policy manual need not be promulgated 
pursuant to state Administrative Procedure Act). 
 163. Alaska Dep’t of Corr., Tribal Government-to-Government Relations, Index No. 107.01, 
(Apr. 22, 2002) (“This policy is to provide guidance to all departmental employees involved in 
any action that will significantly or uniquely affect federally recognized tribal governments in 
Alaska.”). 
 164. The Urban Institute, The Transition from Jail to Community (TJC) Initiative (2009), 
http://www.urbaninstitute.org/projects/tjc/index.cfm. 
 165. See IND. CODE ANN. § 11-12-4-1(a) (West 2004) (“The department shall adopt under 
[the state Administrative Procedure Act] minimum standards for county jails . . . .”); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 441.055 (LexisNexis 1999) (requiring the Department of Corrections to promulgate 
regulations pursuant to the state Administrative Procedure Act establishing minimum standards 
for jails for those counties that house state prisoners); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-20-9(a)(2) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  New York City also has a Board of Correction that sets minimum standards 
for the City’s jails, pursuant to the City’s Administrative Procedure Act.  See Martin F. Horn, Jail 
Rules Must Be Updated, N.Y. L.J., June 12, 2007, at 2; Michael B. Mushlin, John Horan, David 
Lenefsky, Madeline deLone, John M. Brickman, & Clay Hiles, Independent Oversight of N.Y. 
Jails, N.Y. L.J., May 17, 2007, at 2. 
 166. See, e.g., Byar v. Lee, 336 F. Supp. 2d 896, 906 (W.D. Ark. 2004) (County sheriff 
promulgated jail policies based on the Ten Commandments, which the district court concluded 
violated the Establishment Clause.). 
 167. Cf. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 154, at 37 (describing the value of oversight of 
rulemaking). 
 168. In some states, corrections authorities are excluded entirely from all provisions of the 
state administrative procedure act or from the definition of “agency,” thereby exempting their 
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B.   The Impact on Prisoners, Their Families, and Free Communities 
Given the millions of incarcerated people and the hundreds of thousands 
of prisoners returning home each year, it is now more important than ever to 
subject prison and jail regulations to public scrutiny.  This section describes the 
breadth and range of such policies, including their effects on prisoners, their 
families, and free communities.  The purpose is to demonstrate why at least 
some corrections policies—perhaps those limiting prisoners’ substantial rights 
and those affecting outside communities—should be subject to notice-and-
comment rulemaking.169
actions from all provisions of the state administrative procedure act, including judicial review of 
final “agency” action.  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-212 (1997); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5201(2) 
(1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-102(2)(a)(ii) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233B.039(1)(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01(2)(m) (Supp. 2009); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
2001.226 (Vernon 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4002(B)(9)-(10) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 34.05.030(c) (West 2003); Harrison v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 164 S.W.3d 871, 876 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that section 2001.226 of the Texas Administrative Procedure Act 
“expressly bars” judicial review of a Department of Criminal Justice disciplinary proceeding).  
Other states, like Colorado, Kansas, and Wyoming, expressly exclude corrections policies from 
state administrative procedure act provisions for judicial review.  COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 17-1-111, 
24-4-106 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-603(c)(1)-(3) (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-105(a) 
(2009) (“The promulgation of substantive rules by the department, the conduct of its hearings and 
its final decisions are specifically exempt from all provisions of the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act including the provisions for judicial review . . . .”).  See also Stanhope v. State, 825 
P.2d 25, 26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a prisoner classification decision is not “subject to 
judicial review under the Arizona Administrative Review Act”); Quigley v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 
745 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that under the state Administrative 
Procedure Act a prisoner was not entitled to judicial review of DOC statement of reasons for rule 
forbidding prisoners to retain notarized documents, and concluding that the prisoner’s “only 
avenue for judicial review is to seek declaratory or other relief in circuit court”).  State 
administrative procedure acts sometimes provide for a form of judicial review or “declaratory 
judgment” specific to rulemaking; if corrections policies are exempt from rulemaking, such an 
action presumably would not be available.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-22-10 (LexisNexis 2000); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1034 (2004); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11350 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 4-175 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-10 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
91-7 (LexisNexis 2007); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-125 (LexisNexis 2004); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 536.050(1) (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:24 (LexisNexis 2006); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-8-8 (LexisNexis 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-4 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
28-32-42(2) (Supp. 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 306 (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-
35-7 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-150(a) (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-14 (2004); TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.040 (Vernon 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4026 (2008); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 34.05.514 (West 2003).  One such form of declaratory judgment was provided in 
the 1961 Model State Administrative Procedure Act.  BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 9.2.1, at 556. 
 169. My purpose here is not to evaluate these policies, and certainly not to rate 
implementation and compliance in real life.  The existence of policies—even regulations subject 
to state administrative procedure act requirements—does not guarantee that a corrections system 
will be well-run.  The Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), for example, has 189 policy 
directives on its web site, but the inadequacies of its health care system are infamous.  See, e.g., 
Elizabeth Alexander, Prison Health Care, Political Choice, and the Accidental Death Penalty, 11 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2009) (focusing on Michigan’s DOC). 
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1. The effect on prisoners 
Prison and jail policies affect almost every area of prisoners’ lives.170  
Classification,171 disciplinary,172 and grievance policies173 all have a 
tremendous impact on how prisoners serve their sentence and what recourse 
they have to courts and other authorities.  Corrections policies govern medical 
and mental health care,174 including prenatal and OB/GYN care,175 shackling 
of women in labor and delivery,176 and access to abortion.177  Prison sexual 
 170. Robertson, The Majority Opinion, supra note 90, at 167 (“Prison rules are wide-ranging 
in scope.”).  This Article focuses only on written regulations, rules, and policies.  Unwritten 
custom can be of critical significance in all organizations, but perhaps especially in corrections, 
where the discretion and judgment of line staff can greatly affect prisoners’ daily lives.  Cf. JOHN 
J. DIIULIO, JR., GOVERNING PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL 
MANAGEMENT 238 (1987) (“In most prisons, what correctional officers do and how they do it 
depends largely on their personalities or temperaments.  They must exercise judgment on a wide 
range of matters.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Ala. Dep’t of Corr., Classification of Inmates, Admin. Reg. 400 (Nov. 10, 
2004), available at http://www.doc.state.al.us/docs/AdminRegs/AR400.pdf; Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 
Offender Classification, Admin. Reg. 600-01 (Oct. 15, 2009), available at https://exdoc.state.co.us 
/userfiles/regulations/pdf/0600_01.pdf; Conn. Dep’t of Corr., Offender Classification, Admin. Dir. 
9.2 (July 1, 2006), available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0902.pdf; D.C. Dep’t 
of Corr., Classification, Program Statement No. 4090.3D (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://doc. 
dc.gov/doc/frames.asp?doc=/doc/lib/doc/program_statements/4000/PS_4090_3D_Classification_9
809.pdf. 
 172. See, e.g., Ala. Dep’t of Corr., Disciplinary Hearing Procedures for Major Rule 
Violations, Admin. Reg. 403 (Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://www.doc.state.al.us/docs/Admin 
Regs/AR403.pdf; Conn. Dep’t of Corr., Code of Penal Discipline, Admin. Dir. 9.5 (Jan. 1, 2008), 
available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0905.pdf; Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Policies 
& Procedures, Uniform Disciplinary Procedures, Index No. 502.01 (Oct. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/502-01.pdf. 
 173. See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Corr., Inmate Administrative Remedies, Admin. Dir. 9.6 (Jan. 
31, 2009), available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0906.pdf; D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 
Inmate Grievance Procedures, Program Statement No. 4030.1F (Jan. 21, 2008), available at 
http://doc.dc.gov/doc/frames.asp?doc=/doc/lib/doc/program_statements/4000/ps_4030_1f_inmate
_grievance_procedures_1_21_08.pdf; Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Policies & Procedures, Inmate 
Grievance Procedures, Index No. 501.01 (Sept. 15, 2007), available at http://www.state.tn.us/corr 
ection/pdf/501-01.pdf. 
 174. See, e.g., D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Health Services, Program Statement No. 6000.1D (Feb. 
28, 2008), available at http://doc.dc.gov/doc/frames.asp?doc=/doc/lib/doc/program_statements/60 
00/PM_6000_1D_Medical_Mgmt_Final_022808.pdf; Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Policies & 
Procedures, Inmate Co-payment for Health Services, Index No. 113.15, at 6 (Feb. 15, 2008), 
available at http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/113-15.pdf (providing for a co-pay of three 
dollars for medical visits initiated by the inmate, including an initial request for a pregnancy test, 
optometry services, and treatment for “self-injurious behavior”). 
 175. See DIANA KASDAN, ACLU REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT, STATE STANDARDS 
FOR PREGNANCY-RELATED HEALTH CARE IN PRISON (2008), available at http://72.3.233.244/rep 
roductiverights/gen/pregnancycareinprison.html (collecting department of corrections policies 
regarding a range of reproductive issues, and comparing them with national standards); Ellen M. 
Barry, Bad Medicine: Health Care Inadequacies in Women’s Prisons, 16 CRIM. JUST. 38 (Spring 
2001). 
 176. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 
AND SHACKLING OF PREGNANT WOMEN (2006). 
 177. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 415.30(j) (2007), available at http://www.ilga.gov/ 
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violence and custodial sexual abuse, the subjects of extensive advocacy and 
litigation,178 are also targeted by prison policies.179  In light of the growing 
commission/jcar/admincode/020/020004150000300R.html; Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (applying Turner to strike down a Missouri policy that refused to transport women 
prisoners for elective abortions); Colo. State Dep’t of Corr., Birth Control, Pregnancy, Child 
Placement, and Abortion, Admin. Reg. 700-12 (Nov. 1, 2008), http://exdoc.state.co.us/userfiles/re 
gulations/pdf/0700_12.pdf; Mass. Dep’t of Corr., Health Services Division, Special Health Care 
Practices, 103 DOC 620.04 (July 1, 2004), http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/policies/620.pdf; 
Budnitz, supra note 88, at 1298-99 (describing state corrections departments’ policies on 
prisoners’ access to abortion).  See also Ark. Bd. of Corr., Prenatal Care/Pregnant 
Inmates/Residents, Admin. Reg. No. 829 (Aug. 1, 2000), http://www.adc.arkansas.gov/adcar_pdf/ 
AR829.pdf.  The Arkansas policy does not use the word “abortion.”  It states that the purpose of 
the policy is “to ensure that pregnant inmates/residents of the Department of Correction and the 
Department of Community Punishment are provided comprehensive health care services 
necessary to reach term or to interrupt pregnancy in accordance with applicable statutes, standards 
and regulations.”  Id. 
 178. See generally Jeff Seidel, Sexual Assaults on Female Inmates Went Unheeded, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, Jan. 4, 2009 (describing litigation in which the State of Michigan paid more than $50 
million in a case alleging rampant systemic sexual abuse of women prisoners by male guards); 
Brenda V. Smith, Reforming, Reclaiming or Reframing Womanhood: Reflections on Advocacy for 
Women in Custody, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1 (2007); Brenda V. Smith, Sexual Abuse of 
Women in United States Prisons: A Modern Corollary of Slavery, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 571 
(2006). 
 179. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 3007, 3401.5 (2008), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Regulations/Adult_Operations/docs/Title15-2008.pdf (“Inmate Sexual 
Behavior” and “Employee Sexual Misconduct”); Ala. Dep’t of Corr., Inmate Sexual Offenses & 
Custodial Sexual Misconduct, AR 454 (May 22, 2008), available at http://www.doc.state.al.us/do 
cs/AdminRegs/AR454.pdf; Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., Department Order Manual, Sexual Misconduct 
and Sexual Assaults, No. 125.01 (June 2, 2009), available at http://www.adc.state.az.us/Jill_100_ 
125.aspx#125.01; Conn. Dep’t of Corr., Sexual Assault Prevention Policy, Admin. Dir. 6.12 (Aug. 
15, 2009), available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0612.pdf; D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 
Elimination of Sexual Abuse, Assault, and Misconduct, Program Statement No. 3350.2E (Feb. 21, 
2007), available at http://doc.dc.gov/doc/frames.asp?doc=/doc/lib/doc/program_statements/3000/ 
PS_3350.2E_PRISON_RAPE_ELIMINATION_2-21-07.pdf; Ky. Dep’t of Corr., Policies & 
Procedures, Sexual Abuse/Assault Prevention and Intervention, Policy No. 14.7 (Feb. 3, 2006), 
available at http://www.corrections.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/EFF984A4-958F-4DA2-96E8-4CD391 
BFCD75/107408/1495.pdf; Mass. Dep’t of Corr., Sexually Abusive Behavior Prevention & 
Intervention Policy, 103 DOC 519 (Aug. 5, 2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/ 
doc/policies/519.pdf; Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Prohibited Sexual Conduct Involving Prisoners, Policy 
No. 03.03.140 (July, 9, 2007), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/03_0 
3_140_199869_7.pdf; Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Prison Rape Elimination Act, Policy 202.057 (May 5, 
2009), available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/html/DPW_Display_TOC.asp?Opt=2 
02.057.htm; Nev. Dep’t of Corr., Sexual Crimes and Sexual Misconduct: Prevention, Reduction 
and Investigation, AR 155 (May 8, 2008), available at http://www.doc.nv.gov/ar/pdf/AR155.pdf; 
N.H. Dep’t of Corr., Sexual Harassment, Policy and Procedure Directive 2.39 (Feb. 1, 2008), 
available at http://www.nh.gov/nhdoc/documents/2-39.pdf; N.M. Corr. Dep’t, Offender 
Protection Against Abuse and Sexual Misconduct; Reporting Procedures, CD-150100 (Jan. 28, 
2009), available at http://corrections.state.nm.us/policies/current/CD-150100.pdf; Ohio Dep’t of 
Rehab. and Corr., Inmate Sexual Assault and Misconduct, No. 79-ISA-01 (July 1, 2005), 
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/drc_policies/documents/79-ISA-01.pdf; Oklahoma Prison Rape 
Elimination Act, OP-030601 (2008), http://www.doc.state.ok.us/Offtech/op030601.pdf; Penn. 
Dep’t of Corr., Sexual Harassment of or Sexual Contact with Inmates, Policy No. DC–ADM 008 
(July 25, 2008), available at http://www.cor.state.pa.us/standards/lib/standards/DC- ADM_008_ 
Sexual_Harassment_of_or_Sexual_Contact_with_Inmates.pdf; Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., Protection 
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number of female prisoners180 and litigation on their behalf,181 some 
jurisdictions have adopted non-discrimination policies,182 or policies regarding 
so-called “gender-responsive” programming.183  Corrections policies even 
address the gender categorization of prisoners for the purposes of housing.184  
In short, prison regulations affect issues ranging from a prisoner’s core 
definition of self to how she will serve her time and when she will be released. 
2. The impact on prisoners’ families 
Policies affecting prisoners’ families and children are even more 
appropriately formulated through procedures that permit public input.  Prison 
policies can greatly affect the extent of family contact and can even define who 
is considered a part of a prisoner’s “family.” 
From Sexual Misconduct Against Offenders, Policy and Procedure No. 3.402 (Jan. 14, 2008), 
available at http://doc.state.wy.us/Media.aspx?mediaId=34. 
 180. JOANNE BELKNAP, THE INVISIBLE WOMAN: GENDER, CRIME & JUSTICE (2000); MEDA 
CHESNEY-LIND, THE FEMALE OFFENDER: GIRLS, WOMEN & CRIME (1997); Ryan S. King, 
Moving Toward a Gender-Appropriate Response in the Criminal Justice System, 33 NEW ENG. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3 (2007); Marsha L. Levick & Francine T. Sherman, When 
Individual Differences Demand Equal Treatment: An Equal Rights Approach to the Special Needs 
of Girls in the Juvenile Justice System, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 9 (Spring 2003).  See also SILJA J. 
TALVI, WOMEN BEHIND BARS: THE CRISIS OF WOMEN IN THE U.S. PRISON SYSTEM (2007). 
 181. Compare Roubideaux v. N.D. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 570 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(concluding no equal protection and no Title IX violation in provision of programming at male 
and female facilities), Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 107 F.3d 609, 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding 
no Title IX violation because comparing male and female prisoners is like comparing “apples to 
oranges”), and Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 925-26 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(concluding no equal protection violation because male and female prisoners were not “similarly 
situated”), with Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1994) (Title IX applies to 
prisons and requires equality, not just parity), and Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (D. Mich. 
1979) (concluding that lack of programming and educational opportunities for female prisoners 
violated equal protection). 
 182. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., Female Offender Services, 103 DOC 425 (July 23, 2008), 
http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/policies/425.pdf; Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Parity for Female 
Offenders, Policy No. 102.210 (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy 
2/html/DPW_Display_TOC.asp?Opt=102.210.htm; Okla. Dep’t of Corr., Female Offender 
Management, OP-090501 (June 17, 2008), http://www.doc.state.ok.us/Offtech/op090501.pdf. 
 183. See Cassandra Shaylor, Neither Kind Nor Gentle: The Perils of ‘Gender Responsive 
Justice,’ in PHIL SCRATON & JUDE MCCULLOCH, THE VIOLENCE OF INCARCERATION 147-48 
(2008) (criticizing “gender-responsive” programming as reinforcing gender stereotypes and a 
binary notion of gender). 
 184. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Gender Classification and Housing, Program Statement No. 4020.3 
para. 2(a) (Feb. 20, 2009) (“DOC shall classify an inmate who has male genitals as a male and one 
who has female genitals as a female, unless otherwise classified by the Transgender Committee 
consistent with this policy.”). See also Sydney Tarzwell, The Gender Lines Are Marked With 
Razor Wire: Addressing State Prison Policies and Practices for the Management of Transgender 
Prisoners, 38 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 167, 190-206 (2006) (summarizing then-existing state 
policies regarding transgender prisoners);  Gabriel Arkles, Safety and Solidarity Across Gender 
Lines: Rethinking Segregation of Transgender People in Detention, 18 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. 
Rev. 515, 525-27 (2009); Dean Spade, Keynote Address: Trans Law & Politics on a Neoliberal 
Landscape, 18 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 353, 353 (2009). 
356 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 14:329 
 
With an unprecedented number of prisoners, there is increasing evidence 
of the effects of incarceration for prisoners’ families, and particularly their 
children.185  More than two million American children have an incarcerated 
parent.186  The children of the incarcerated bear “material and psychological 
burdens”;187 they are more likely to experience mental health issues and are 
vulnerable to foster care placement.188  Ultimately, they are at heightened risk 
of being incarcerated themselves.189
Not surprisingly, commentators emphasize the importance of maintaining 
prisoners’ family ties, through letters, phone calls, and visits.190  Corrections 
regulations affect all three modes of communication.  Maintaining telephone 
contact is especially important because facilities are frequently located far from 
major population centers.191  Yet collect calls from prison are often 
prohibitively expensive, in part because of rates determined by contracts 
between corrections officials and phone companies.192  Prison telephone 
policies range from an eight-page policy for the Michigan Department of 
Corrections to a one-and-a-half-page policy for the State of Wyoming.  These 
policies also include provisions for monitoring, call lists, and the duration and 
frequency of calls.193
 185. See TODD CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES 93-106 (2007); TRAVIS, supra note 1, at 
119 (“[P]rison places an indescribable burden on the relationships between [incarcerated] parents 
and their children.”); Donald Braman, Families and Incarceration, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, 
supra note 7, at 117 (“[T]he dramatic increase in the use of incarceration over the last two decades 
has in many ways missed its mark, injuring the families of prisoners often as much as and 
sometimes more than criminal offenders themselves.”).  See generally Philip M. Genty, Damage 
to Family Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of Parental Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1671 (2003). 
 186. Dolovich, supra note 13, at 247. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Megan Comfort, Punishment Beyond the Legal Offender, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
271, 280 (2007). 
 189. Dolovich, supra note 13, at 247; Nkechi Taifa & Catherine Beane, Integrative Solutions 
to Interrelated Issues: A Multidisciplinary Look Behind the Cycle of Incarceration, 3 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 283, 289 (2009) (quoting a study finding that “forty-six percent of jail inmates had a 
family member who had been incarcerated”). 
 190. See Christy A. Visher, Returning Home: Emerging Findings and Policy Lessons About 
Prisoner Reentry, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 93 (Dec. 2007) (“[M]aintaining family connections 
through letters, phone calls, and personal visits has been shown to reduce recidivism rates.”). 
 191. Genty, supra note 185, at 1673 (“[S]ixty-two percent of incarcerated parents in state 
prisons and eighty-two percent in federal prison are incarcerated more than one hundred miles 
from their homes.”). 
 192. See Walton v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 863 N.E.2d 1001 (N.Y. 2007) 
(Prisoners’ families challenged proposed phone rates before New York’s Public Service 
Commission and in a lawsuit); MEDIA JUSTICE FUND, CRIMINAL CHARGES: EXCESSIVE PRISON 
PHONE RATES TAKE A TOLL ON INNOCENT FAMILIES; National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, N.Y. Prisons Make Millions Profiteering on Inmate Phone Calls, 31 CHAMPION 8 (Jan.-
Feb. 2007) (2009). 
 193. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Prisoner Telephone Use, Policy Directive No. 05.03.130 (Jan. 1, 
2009), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/05_03_130_295734_7.pdf; 
Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., Administrative Regulations, Inmate Telephone Use, Policy No. 2.403 
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Corrections policies can also closely regulate family visitation.194  For 
instance, Michigan’s policy regarding the conduct of contact family visits—a 
policy directive and not an administrative regulation—imposes specific limits 
on physical contact: 
During contact visits, physical contact between prisoners and visitors 
is prohibited except for one kiss and one embrace between a prisoner 
and each of his/her visitors at the beginning and end of each visit and 
when a picture is being taken.  In addition, a prisoner and his/her 
visitor are permitted to have their arms around the shoulders of one 
another and may hold hands.  A prisoner who is a parent also may 
appropriately touch and hold his/her child if under two years old and 
bottle feed his/her infant while visiting.195
Such restrictive regulations can frighten children and inhibit visitation.196
However, the effects of these prison rules on prisoners’ families extend 
beyond direct limitations on visitation.  When visiting prison or jail, prisoners’ 
relatives are exposed repeatedly to correctional policies and norms, which can 
affect their behavior and habits.197  This produces “a form of socialization to 
carceral norms,”198 a kind of “secondary prisonization.”199  Later, when 
prisoners return home, their families are affected by the “psychological impact 
of confinement on the offender”;200 formerly incarcerated parents employ 
discipline methods akin to those imposed in a corrections setting.201
Corrections regulations can even define who is in a prisoner’s “family.”  
For example, provisions of the MDOC administrative regulations restrict visits 
by minor members of a prisoner’s extended family: Children are forbidden to 
visit unless they are an emancipated minor or the child, step-child, grandchild, 
sibling, step-sibling, or half-sibling of the prisoner.202  The policy specifically 
forbids visitation by a prisoner’s child if the prisoner’s parental rights have 
been terminated.203  These rules were challenged and ultimately upheld in a 
(2009), available at http://doc.state.wy.us/Media.aspx?mediaId=21 . 
 194. California’s visitation policy comprises eight sections of the California Administrative 
Code.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 §§ 3170-78 (2007).  Because visitation policies affect both 
prisoners and visitors, they may not be exempt under state administrative procedure act exceptions 
for rules regarding only “inmates.”  BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 6.17.7, at 414. 
 195. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Policy No. 05.03.140(V) (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www. 
michigan.gov/documents/corrections/05_03_140_210434_7.pdf. 
 196. Amy Fettig, Women Prisoners: Altering the Cycle of Abuse, 36 A.B.A. SEC. HUM. RTS. 
2, 3 (Spring 2009) 
 197. Comfort, supra note 188, at 279. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 281. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Policy No. 05.03.140(J)(4) (Oct. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/05_03_140_210434_7.pdf. 
 203. Id. at Policy No. 05.03.140(J)(4)(1). 
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2003 Supreme Court case, Overton v. Bazzetta.204  The Bazzetta plaintiffs 
pointed to the importance of extended family (including cousins, nieces, and 
nephews), as well as the benefits of maintaining a parent-child relationship 
despite the termination of parental rights.205  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
upheld the regulations under Turner, concluding that they were reasonably 
related to a legitimate penological interest, and writing that this was “not an 
appropriate case” in which to “further elaborat[e]” on constitutional protections 
for family ties.206
Another example of how corrections regulations define “family” is 
whether same-sex partners are permitted to participate in overnight “family” or 
“conjugal” visits.207  In 2007, under threat of litigation, and following a notice-
and-comment period, California amended its regulation to include registered 
domestic partners in the definition of “immediate family,” thus permitting 
same-sex partners to participate in overnight visits.208  The Mississippi DOC, 
by contrast, restricts such visits to opposite-sex marriages.209  Aside from being 
challenged through litigation, regulations defining and affecting families should 
be subject to input from prisoners’ partners and kin in more jurisdictions. 
3. Repercussions in free communities 
Policies potentially affecting free communities are most suitable for 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.  Mass incarceration has tremendous effects 
on poor communities of color,210 as does prisoner reentry.211  Because some 
communities are so enmeshed in the criminal justice system—consider the so-
called “Million Dollar Blocks”212 in which the State spends at least that much 
on incarceration annually—these policies can have a real effect on public 
 204. 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (reviewing challenge to rule 791.6609 of the Michigan 
Administrative Code). 
 205. See Brief of the Respondents, Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (No. 02-94), 
2003 WL 469673; Brief of the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (No. 02-94), 
2003 WL 469578. 
 206. 539 U.S. at 131. 
 207. See Wiggum, supra note 14. 
 208. Id. at 369 & n.85 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3000 (2009)). 
 209. Id. at 374. 
 210. CLEAR, supra note 185, at 106-20; TRAVIS, supra note 1, at 120 (“[I]n those 
communities where incarceration rates are high, the experience of having a mother or father in 
prison is now quite commonplace, with untold consequences for foster care systems, 
multigenerational households, social services delivery, community norms, childhood 
development, and parenting patterns.”); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the 
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly 
Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 628 n.22 (2006) (citing Roberts, supra note 7, at 
1276 (“Research in several cities reveals that the exit and reentry of inmates is geographically 
concentrated in the poorest, minority neighborhoods.”)). 
 211. See CADORA, supra note 17; TRAVIS, supra note 1, at xvii (describing prisoner reentry 
as “an unprecedented challenge for our society”). 
 212. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 1, at 20. 
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health and the local economy.213  Alan Elsner has written that “we cannot 
separate ourselves from those who are behind bars,”214 because the “vast 
majority of inmates” eventually return to the community.215  “Society is 
profoundly influenced by the abuses they suffer or perpetrate,” he writes.216  
“[T]he skills they pick up—whether legitimate or criminal—the diseases they 
contract and the treatment they receive or do not receive”217 all affect the 
communities to which prisoners return. 
Policies (or the lack of policies) addressing management of certain 
medical issues can have repercussions for broader communities.  The return of 
large numbers of prisoners with poorly managed chronic conditions and mental 
health issues can strain existing community health networks.218  Jails in large 
metropolitan areas like New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago have become the 
“nation’s largest mental health facilities.”219  Whether prisoners receive 
appropriate mental health care—or are treated and housed in ways that 
exacerbate their illness220—has implications for whether they will make a 
successful return to the community.  Chronic mental health problems that are 
not adequately treated “frustrate the process of reintegration for released 
prisoners and foster[] recidivism, unemployment, homelessness for the former 
prisoner, and economic and emotional strain on his family and community.”221
Other types of infectious disease—such as drug-resistant TB, Hepatitis C, 
and HIV—can spread quickly in prisons that are poorly managed.222  The 
spread of these diseases within institutions can have catastrophic results beyond 
the gates: 
 213. DINA ROSE & TODD CLEAR, INCARCERATION, REENTRY & SOCIAL CAPITAL: SOCIAL 
NETWORKS IN THE BALANCE 183 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/410623 
_SocialCapital.pdf (arguing that “concentrated coercive mobility damages neighborhoods because 
it diminishes available levels of social capital and collective efficacy”). 
 214. ELSNER, supra note 77, at 15. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. John V. Jacobi, Prison Health, Public Health: Obligations & Opportunities, 31 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 447, 448 (2005). 
 219. Id. at 452 (quoting Nicholas Freudenberg, Jails, Prisons & the Health of Urban 
Populations: A Review of the Impact of the Correctional System on Community Health, 78:2 J. 
URBAN HEALTH 214, 220 (2001)). 
 220. See Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 402-405 (2006) (describing how prison disciplinary rules often fail to take 
account of the symptoms of mental illness, and how placement in disciplinary segregation can 
aggravate mental illness). 
 221. Jacobi, supra note 218, at 467.  See also William J. Rich, The Path of Mentally Ill 
Offenders, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 112-13 (2009) (discussing reentry problems for the 
mentally ill). 
 222. Dolovich, supra note 13, at 246 (“Severe overcrowding in often unhygienic conditions, 
together with what is frequently an absence of institutional strategies for preventing the spread of 
disease, means that prisoners face infection rates for HIV, hepatitis C, tuberculosis, and even staph 
that are far in excess of infection rates outside the prison.”). 
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Almost all of the two million prisoners now in prisons and jails will 
return to their communities one day.  If, due to poor prison health care, 
they return with uncontrolled syphilis, tuberculosis, HIV, and other 
infectious conditions, they will likely infect many around them.  In 
these circumstances, prisons and jails serve as “epidemiological 
pumps,” amplifying infectious conditions, perhaps even transforming 
them into treatment-resistant strains, and then sending them out into 
society for distribution.  It is in the interest of all in society to prevent 
the population health effects that demonstrably flow from mistreatment 
of the health conditions of prisoners.223
Department of Corrections policies may cover HIV treatment and 
discharge planning,224 as well as preventing the spread of tuberculosis225 and 
communicable blood-borne infections.226  DOC policies may also cover other 
medical and mental health care.227  All of these policies should be subject to 
input from community and public health organizations. 
Release and reentry planning is another suitable area for notice-and-
comment.  As incarceration rates have skyrocketed, boosting the numbers of 
returning prisoners, reentry issues have become more important.228  These 
returning prisoners are concentrated in the poorest communities, compounding 
 223. Jacobi, supra note 218, at 448.  See also TRAVIS, supra note 1, at 188 (arguing that 
prison health officials have “an obligation to society as a whole” to develop “policies that reduce 
transmission [of communicable diseases] within the communities to which the prisoners return”); 
Comfort, supra note 188, at 282; NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION, REPORT 
15 (June 2009) (recommending that Congress fund research “into whether consensual and/or non-
consensual sexual activity in the correctional system plays a role in infecting populations outside 
of corrections with HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections.”). 
 224. See, e.g., Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., AIDS: Education, Prevention, and Case Management, 
Index No. 113.45 (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/113-45.pdf 
(“Inmates currently on medication regimens shall be provided at least a fourteen (14) day supply, 
or their current supply of prescribed medication, whichever is greater.”). 
 225. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Policy Nos. 03.04.100, 03.04.115 (Feb. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,1607,7-119-1441_44369---,00.html (“Health Services” 
and “Control of Tuberculosis”); Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Tuberculosis Control for Applicants, 
Employees, Contractors, Volunteers & Students, Policy No. 105.180 (May 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/html/DPW_Display_TOC.asp?Opt=105.180.htm. 
 226. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Control of Communicable Bloodborne Diseases, Policy No. 
03.04.120 (July 3, 2000), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/03_04_1 
20_180946_7.pdf; Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Bloodborne Pathogen Exposure Control Plan, Policy No. 
105.170 (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/html/ DPW_Display 
TOC.asp?Opt=105.170.htm. 
 227. See Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Access to Health Care, Index No. 113.30 (Feb. 15, 2008), 
available at http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/113-30.pdf; Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Inmate Co-
Pay, Index No. 113.15 (Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/113-
15.pdf; Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Medical Transfer, Index No. 113.04 (Feb. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/113-04.pdf; Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Substance Abuse Services 
Delivery, Index No. 113.95 (Mar. 15, 2008), available at http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/11 
3-95.pdf. 
 228. See TRAVIS, supra note 1, at xvii. 
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the strain.229  Again, jurisdictions have a range of policies regarding transition 
and release planning, ranging from ambitious plans to provide “a 
comprehensive, collaborative, seamless reentry strategy,”230 to fairly simple 
instructions for release procedures (e.g., verify identity, return personal effects, 
and issue “gate pay” and “dress-out clothing”).231
Many of the policies discussed in this section have an impact beyond 
prison walls.  Some address prisoners’ treatment, affecting many people who 
will someday return to free communities.  Others affect the families and 
children of prisoners while they are incarcerated.  Still others have a direct 
effect on the nexus between prisons and the free world.  Because of the great 
impact of such policies, they should be promulgated according to procedures 
that promote transparency and public input. 
III. THE CASE FOR NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING (OR LESS 
DEFERENCE) 
A.  The Value of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking. 
In light of their significant impact, critical corrections regulations should 
be subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking or should be awarded less 
deference by courts, at least when they affect prisoners’ substantive rights or 
impact free communities.232  Administrative law scholars have noted that the 
benefits of notice-and-comment rulemaking include transparency and 
 229. See, e.g., NANCY G. LAVIGNE & VERA KACHNOWSKI WITH JEREMY TRAVIS, REBECCA 
NASER & CHRISTY VISHER, A PORTRAIT OF PRISONER REENTRY IN MARYLAND 2 (2003), 
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410655_MDPortraitReentry.pdf (59% of 
prisoners released in Maryland in 2001 returned to Baltimore City, and most of them returned to a 
few poor neighborhoods in Baltimore, some of which received more than 200 prisoners in a 
year—more than many Maryland counties.); Roberts, supra note 7, at 1276 (“72% of all of New 
York State’s prisoners came from only 7 of New York City’s 55 community board districts” and 
“53% of Illinois prisoners released in 2001 returned to Chicago.”). 
 230. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., Reentry Policy, 103 DOC 493 (Oct. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/policies/493.pdf. 
 231. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Serv., Release Preparation, No. 209.01 (Mar. 1, 1980), available at 
http://www.corrections.state.ne.us/policies/files/ar209.01.pdf. 
 232. Prison grievance policies should be among the rules subject to rulemaking procedures.  It 
is true that federal APA exempts agencies’ procedural rules from notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.  1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 6.5, at 350-53 (describing distinction between 
substantive and procedural rules).  However, prison grievance policies are more than mere 
“bureaucratic housekeeping,” or instructions for navigating prison procedures.  Cf.  CORNELIUS 
KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 23 
(1995).  They affect prisoners’ substantive rights, routinely determining whether they will be able 
to seek relief for claimed constitutional violations.  Accordingly, they should not automatically be 
deemed solely “procedural” and exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking.  See Pickus v. 
U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rejecting argument that Board of Parole 
rules were mere statements of agency policy or procedural rules, on the grounds that they 
“substantially affect[] the rights of persons subject to agency regulations”). 
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accountability, information-gathering, and democratic participation.233  Notice-
and-comment rulemaking permits agencies to solicit information and technical 
expertise.234  In addition, rulemaking “provid[es] an effective way for members 
of the public to organize.”235  Rulemaking procedures can also improve 
political accountability by permitting the chief executive and legislature to 
monitor agencies’ work.236  Thus, a notice-and-comment period should 
enhance both the “accuracy” and the “legitimacy” of the resultant rule.237
Given the vast numbers of incarcerated people, transparency, 
accountability, and democratic participation in corrections policies are more 
important than ever.  Other avenues for democratic participation are closed to 
prisoners and their communities, in ways both legal and practical.238  Under 
state felon disenfranchisement laws, some 5.3 million Americans have lost the 
right to vote; this figure includes 1.4 million, or about 13% of all African-
American men.239  Disenfranchisement is not the only way that mass 
incarceration reduces the political power of poor communities; because the 
incarcerated are counted as residents in the jurisdictions in which they are 
 233. KERWIN, supra note 232, at 53 (writing that the “core elements” of rulemaking are 
“information, participation, and accountability”).  See also BONFIELD, supra note 138, at §§ 5.2.1, 
5.2.2 & 5.2.3, at 144-50 (describing the benefits of rulemaking as promoting rules that are 
“lawful,” “technically sound,” and “politically responsible”); CARY COGLIANESE, HEATHER 
KILMARTIN & EVAN MENDELSON, TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE 
RULEMAKING PROCESS 2-5 (July 2008) (arguing that an “optimal” level of public participation 
can improve “legitimacy” and result in “more informed policy decisions”); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, 
supra note 117, at § 6.8 (describing the “many advantages of rules and rulemaking” as including 
“political accountability” and “fairness”); Crowley, supra note 126, at 1518-19.  See also Lee, 
supra note 12, at 1747-50 (identifying benefits of formal speech policies in First Amendment 
context as promoting “internal management”, “public accountability”, and “intergovernmental 
accountability”). 
 234. Arthur E. Bonfield, Mandating State Agency Lawmaking by Rule, 2 B.Y.U. J. OF PUB. L. 
161, 170 (1988) (“Agencies making policy by rule are . . . likely to have access to a broader base 
of relevant information.”). 
 235. Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Quest for an Ideal State Administrative Rulemaking 
Procedure, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617, 618 (1991); Bonfield, supra note 234, at 170 (“[N]otice 
and comment procedures typically used in the state agency rulemaking process permit and 
facilitate intervention in that process by members of the general public.”). 
 236. See BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 4.2.3, at 108 (noting that the governor and state 
legislative committees can more easily track rulemaking than some other forms of agency 
lawmaking); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.11, at 511 (noting that rulemaking is 
“transparent” and the notice of a proposed rule gives other political actors an opportunity to affect 
policy). 
 237. Anthony, supra note 130, at 1373. 
 238. See Aman, Globalization, supra note 123, at 126 (“[P]risoners, as well as other needy 
citizens in our society, are not likely to have much impact in normal political arenas; accordingly, 
they have particular needs for transparency and participation in the processes that affect them 
directly.”).  Cf. Lee, supra note 12, at 1715 (noting interaction between incarceration rates and the 
ability of communities “to pursue autonomy and self-fulfillment”). 
 239. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2008), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/ fd_bs_fdlawsinus 
.pdf. 
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imprisoned for the purposes of legislative reapportionment,240 their home 
districts lose political influence.241
Agency rulemaking is one avenue of participation that should remain 
open.  At a minimum, a comment period permits participation by community 
leaders, social scientists, nonprofit social service agencies, medical and mental 
health care providers, corrections professionals, corrections officers’ unions, 
and faith-based organizations.  Notice-and-comment rulemaking could serve as 
an organizing tool for the families of prisoners242 or even as a means of 
gauging the views of prisoners.243  In order for notice-and-comment procedures 
to be effective, interested parties must take advantage of them to attempt to 
affect policy and educate corrections authorities. 
The utility of a notice-and-comment period for soliciting technical 
expertise was demonstrated recently in the process that led to the promulgation 
of the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission (“NPREC”) proposed 
model standards.  The NPREC, created by the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 
2003,244 was charged with drafting model standards for combating prison 
sexual violence; the standards will be finalized and promulgated by the 
Attorney General.245  NPREC solicited public comments on its proposed 
standards, producing important changes in a number of areas.246  The NPREC 
 240. Marie Gottschalk, The Long Reach of the Carceral State: The Politics of Crime, Mass 
Imprisonment, and Penal Reform in the United States and Abroad, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 439, 
444 (2009). 
 241. Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation and the Debate 
Over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1161 (2004) (collective effect of felon 
disenfranchisement laws is to “penalize not only actual wrong-doers, but also the communities 
from which incarcerated prisoners come and the communities to which ex-offenders return by 
reducing their relative political clout”). 
 242. Thanks to Molly Ryan Strehorn, WNEC Law ’09, for this suggestion.  See also 
GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG, supra note 5, at 181-248 for an account of advocacy efforts by a 
group of prisoners’ families. 
 243. See CITIZENS UNITED FOR A RESPONSIBLE BUDGET, 2007-2008 POLICY BRIEF: HOW 
“GENDER RESPONSIVE PRISONS” HARM CALIFORNIA’S WOMEN AND CHILDREN 15-16 (2007), 
available at http://www.nicic.org/Library/022859 (including comments of women prisoners in 
opposition to proposed “gender-responsive” strategy believed to include prison expansion).  The 
public and inmates should also be able to participate in rulemaking regarding penal institutions in 
order to enhance “public understanding and acceptance” of corrections rules.  Carl A. Auerbach, 
Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota, 63 MINN. L. REV. 151, 245 (1979). 
 244. 42 U.S.C. § 15606(a) (2008). 
 245. See NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION, REPORT (June 2009), 
available at http://nprec.us/files/pdfs/NPREC_FinalReport.PDF.  After the Attorney General 
promulgates standards, states that fail to adopt them can lose a portion of their federal funding for 
prisons.  42 U.S.C. § 15607(c)(2) (2008) (providing that a state’s funding under grant programs 
for prison purposes shall be reduced by 5% for each fiscal year unless the chief executive officer 
certifies that the corrections authority is in full compliance with national standards, or will use 5% 
of grant funds to achieve full compliance).  As this Article goes to press, the Attorney General is 
considering the Commission’s proposed model standards.  Although the standards may be 
amended before they are promulgated, the Commission’s process is a useful case study. 
 246. Thanks to Melissa Rothstein and Darby Hickey of Just Detention International for 
sharing information and analysis regarding the NPREC comment period. 
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process differed from typical agency rulemaking in some ways, since it was the 
product of a special commission made up of political appointees with a 
common mission.  Nonetheless, it demonstrated the potential utility of a public 
comment period. 
Some changes to the NPREC standards made them more clear and 
attainable.  For example, the original draft NPREC standards required 
“continuous direct sight and sound supervision of inmates necessary to prevent 
sexual abuse.”247  Corrections officials objected to this rule as overly 
burdensome,248 and prisoners’ rights advocates commented that the supervision 
need not literally be continuous.249  Accordingly, the standard was changed to 
require supervision “necessary to protect inmates from sexual abuse.”250
The final proposed standards responded more fully to other concerns that 
were familiar to the Commission and addressed in the original draft, but that 
were amplified in the comment period.  One such example concerned the type 
of prisoner complaints that would be deemed  proper exhaustion for the  
purpose of the PLRA exhaustion requirement.  Commentators and advocates 
have decried the PLRA exhaustion requirement as a bar to court intervention in 
cases of custodial sexual abuse.251  The original draft standard addressed this 
issue by stating that “[a]ny report of sexual abuse made at any time after the 
abuse, which names a perpetrator and is made in writing to the agency” would 
be deemed to satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement; it also mandated that 
corrections agencies make available at least one outside avenue of reporting.252  
During the comment period, litigators reiterated the problems their clients 
 247. STANDARDS FOR THE PREVENTION, DETECTION, RESPONSE, AND MONITORING OF 
SEXUAL ABUSE IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS § PP-1, at 18 (Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination 
Comm’n, Proposed Draft 2008) [hereinafter “DRAFT PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS”] (on file 
with author). 
 248. Legal Aid Society Prisoners’ Rights Project, Comments on the Draft National Prison 
Rape Elimination Commission Standards for the Prevention, Detection, Response, and Monitoring 
of Sexual Abuse in Adult Prisons and Jails 22 (2008) (on file with author) (“We have been told 
that correctional personnel read this Standard to require one-on-one supervision of inmates . . . .”).  
See also American Correctional Association, Comments on Proposed Prison Rape Elimination 
Standards and Practices 3 (2008) (on file with author) (deleting the word “continuous” from the 
proposed standard mandating sight and sound supervision of inmates “necessary to prevent sexual 
abuse”). 
 249. Legal Aid Society Prisoners’ Rights Project, supra note 248, at 22 (“There is nothing to 
be gained by this confusion, or by leaving jail and prison officials in the impossible position of 
either claiming compliance with a Standard that they believe that they cannot meet or of 
acknowledging deficiencies and risk losing funding.”).  See also Letter from Sylvia Rivera Law 
Project to the Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination Comm’n 4 (July 7, 2008) [hereinafter Sylvia Rivera 
Law Project] (on file with author) (“We believe that the language of the standards should be 
revised to clarify that sight and sound supervision need not always be literally continuous in every 
situation in order to prevent sexual abuse.”). 
 250. STANDARDS FOR THE PREVENTION, DETECTION, RESPONSE, AND MONITORING OF 
SEXUAL ABUSE IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS, § PP-3, at 10 (Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination 
Comm’n 2009) [hereinafter “FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS”]. 
 251. Schlanger & Shay, supra note 114, at 148-49. 
 252. DRAFT NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 247, § RE-1, at 33. 
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encountered with exhaustion requirements.  Clients who reported sexual abuse 
through outside channels offered by a corrections agency before filing suit were 
deemed by the State and by a federal district court not to have properly 
exhausted, because they failed to file a grievance.253
The final proposed standard made more explicit the types of complaints 
that will be deemed acceptable for PLRA exhaustion purposes and the time 
when exhaustion will be deemed complete.  It stated that an inmate has 
exhausted administrative remedies for purposes of the PLRA when the agency 
makes a final decision on a report of abuse or, if no decision is issued, ninety 
days after the report has been made, “regardless of whether the report was 
made by the inmate, made by a third party, or forwarded from an outside 
official or office.”254  The discussion accompanying the final proposed 
standards explained more fully the problems with the PLRA exhaustion regime, 
namely that (unless modified by the new NPREC standard)255 it essentially 
makes the institution’s grievance deadline the statute of limitations for claims 
of sexual abuse.256
The final proposed NPREC standards also demonstrated the educative 
potential of comments, particularly in provisions concerning LGBT prisoners.  
Some comments by LGBT advocates resulted in concrete changes to the 
standards.  For example, the final proposed standards prohibit the automatic 
segregation of LGBT prisoners as well as the isolation of vulnerable 
prisoners,257 an issue that the original draft standards had addressed in the 
 253. Legal Aid Society Prisoners’ Rights Project, supra note 248, at 7 (describing how the 
exhaustion decision in Amador v. Superintendents of the Department of Correctional Services, 
No. 03 CV 00650, 2007 WL 4326747 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2007) “reflects some of the obstacles to 
the use of litigation to redress patterns of sexual abuse by staff”). 
 254. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § RE-2, at 34.  The final 
proposed standard also contained a provision for “seeking immediate protection from imminent 
sexual abuse”; such complaints are deemed exhausted forty-eight hours after a prisoner has 
notified a staff member of a need for protection.  Id. 
 255. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § RE-2, at 34 (“A report of 
sexual abuse triggers the ninety-day exhaustion period regardless of the length of time that has 
passed between the abuse and the report.”).  The final proposed standard on audits also was more 
specific.  Compare DRAFT PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 247, at § SA-2 (providing 
that the chief executive of each jurisdiction “must certify the agency’s compliance with these 
standards based on results from annual audits of the standards conducted by independent auditors . 
. . .”) with FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § AU-1 (requiring publicly 
available independent audits “at least every three years.”). 
 256. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § RE-2, discussion at 35 
(“Policies that require inmates to navigate a complicated grievance procedure within a short time 
after the abuse can result in the dismissal of meritorious legal claims by victims of sexual 
abuse.”). 
 257. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § SC-2, at 30 (“Lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, or other gender-nonconforming inmates are not placed in particular 
facilities, units or wings solely on the basis of their sexual orientation, genital status, or gender 
identity.  Inmates at high risk for sexual victimization may be placed in segregated housing only 
as a last resort and then only until an alternative means of separation from likely abusers can be 
arranged.”). 
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discussion section and that advocates had urged making a part of the standards 
themselves.258  To facilitate appropriate methods of protecting at-risk prisoners, 
the final proposed standard on screening lists specific pieces of information that 
are to be elicited at intake (e.g., the inmate’s sexual orientation and perception 
of vulnerability),259 another suggestion made by advocates for LGBT 
prisoners.260  Also in response to comments from LGBT advocates,261 the final 
proposed standards use the term “gender non-conforming” to refer to persons 
who may not identify as LGBT but whose gender expression does not match 
gender stereotypes.262  Indeed, the terms “gender identity,” “gender non-
conforming,” and “transgender,” which had been absent from the original draft 
standards, were included in the definition section of the final proposed 
standards.263  In a gain for the transgender community, the discussion 
accompanying the final proposed standards suggests that corrections officials 
refrain from automatically assigning inmates housing based on their birth 
gender or genital status,264 language likely prompted by suggestions.265
Other comments offered by LGBT advocates were not adopted, such as a 
plea that corrections officials acknowledge consensual sex among inmates and 
provide condoms.266  Nonetheless, raising these issues has the potential to 
 258. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Comments on Standards for Adult Prisons 
and Jails 8 (2008) (“The portions of the Discussion section stating that vulnerable inmates should 
be housed in the least restrictive setting possible and must have access to the same privileges and 
programs as inmates housed in general population are so crucial for safety and well-being that 
they should be reflected in the Standards themselves and not simply in the Discussion section.”); 
Sylvia Rivera Law Project, supra note 249, at 12 (arguing against the automatic segregation of 
transgender prisoners). 
 259. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § SC-1, at 27 (providing in part 
that “[a]t a minimum, employees use the following criteria to screen male inmates for risk of 
victimization: mental or physical disability, young age, slight build, first incarceration in prison or 
jail, nonviolent history, prior convictions for sex offenses against an adult or child, sexual 
orientation of gay or bisexual gender nonconformance (e.g., transgender or intersex identity), prior 
sexual victimization, and the inmate’s own perception of vulnerability”). 
 260. Transgender, Gender Variant & Intersex Justice Project et al., Comments on Standards 
for Adult Prisons and Jails 13 (2008) (“The Classification scheme needs to have more specifics, 
and include a set of ‘must have’ pieces of information, such as the person’s gender identity, their 
concerns and wishes, etc.”). 
 261. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 258, at 3. 
 262. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § SC-2, at 30-31. 
 263. Compare Id., glossary at 3-7, with DRAFT PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 
247, glossary at 10-15. 
 264. FINAL PROPOSED NPREC STANDARDS, supra note 250, § SC-2, discussion at 31 (“The 
Commission also strongly urges agencies to give careful thought and consideration to the 
placement of each transgender inmate and not to automatically place transgender individuals in 
male or female housing based on their birth gender or current genital status.”). 
 265. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 258, at 8 (“We recommend 
specifying that the housing preference of transgender inmates to be placed in male or female 
general population (or alternative settings) should be taken into consideration when making 
placement decisions.”). 
 266. For example, LGBT advocates had urged the Commission to acknowledge the existence 
of consensual sex between prisoners and to provide condoms.  Lambda Legal Defense and 
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educate some Commissioners (and corrections professionals) about the 
concerns of members of a community and their advocates. 
Corrections rulemaking procedures can provide a forum for debate about 
issues of great public importance.  After challenges to lethal injection 
procedures under state administrative procedure acts succeeded in California 
and in Maryland,267 these states commenced promulgating lethal injection 
protocols pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking.  In Maryland, the 
rulemaking process promises to be a debate about both treatment of the accused 
and the death penalty itself.268  In California, public hearings and notice-and-
comment also have become a debate about the death penalty.269  Arguably, 
exchanging views about capital punishment in the context of state rulemaking 
promotes democratic participation and political accountability more than airing 
these issues in federal litigation.270
Given the utility of notice-and-comment procedures, state administrative 
procedure act exceptions for “internal” policies should not be interpreted too 
broadly, and they certainly should not encompass all corrections regulations.271  
Aside from prisons, there are other entities whose regulations apply to largely 
“closed” systems that could affect public health and safety.  Nuclear power 
plants, for example, affect public health and safety and are subject to notice-
and-comment rulemaking provisions.272  Moreover, as discussed in Part II.B, 
even prison rules focused at inmates—for example, rules about security, 
visitation, mail, and medical and mental health care—affect free 
communities.273
Education Fund, supra note 258, at 2.  They also had asked that transgender prisoners be 
permitted to identify the gender of those best qualified to search them, and that language regarding 
pregnancy and vaginal penetration be made gender-neutral so as to include transgender men.  
These suggestions were not adopted.  Transgender, Gender Variant & Intersex Justice Project et 
al., supra note 260, at 5-6, 11, 21. 
 267. Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724 (Cal Ct. App. 2008) (concluding 
that lethal injection protocol was subject to provisions of California’s Administrative Procedure 
Act); Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25 (Md. 2006) (concluding that lethal injection protocol was not 
adopted in accordance with provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and thus “may not be 
used until such time as they are properly adopted”). 
 268. Laura Smitherman, Maryland Moves Toward Resuming Executions: O’Malley 
Reluctantly Approves New Protocols for Carrying Out Death Penalty, BALTIMORE SUN, June 25, 
2009; John Wagner, Md. Panel Slows Down Draft of Execution Rules, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 
2009. 
 269. Carol J. Williams, Death Penalty Opponents Speak Out, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at 
A4. 
 270. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1542 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that Eighth 
Amendment litigation regarding methods of execution is being used as a means of halting the 
death penalty through “litigation gridlock”).  But see Ty Alper, The Truth About Physician 
Participation in Lethal Injection, 88 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (rejecting notion that 
lawyers advocating humane methods of execution are merely seeking abolition). 
 271. Massey v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 886 A.2d 585, 599 (Md. 2005) 
(quoting BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 6.17.02, at 402). 
 272. Cf. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 273. BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 6.17.7, at 414 (arguing that in states in which rules 
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Whether prison and jail regulations are subjected to some type of formal 
vetting process should determine how much deference they are accorded by 
courts.274  If the reasoning of Turner is that running a prison requires 
“expertise” and “planning,”275 such qualities are more clearly demonstrated 
when corrections officials follow the same types of rulemaking processes that 
other government agencies observe.276  In the context of federal prison 
litigation, in which comity is so important, deference to state corrections 
regulations is arguably more appropriate when those regulations are 
promulgated pursuant to state administrative law procedures.277
In federal administrative law, the amount of deference accorded agency 
rules depends, in part, on the procedures used to promulgate them.  Of course, 
outside of the corrections context, unlike under Turner, rules that impinge on 
constitutional rights are not entitled to deference.278  More generally, 
“legislative” rules, enacted pursuant to APA notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures, have the force of law and may “impose distinct obligations on 
members of the public.”279  By contrast, “interpretive” rules, or policy 
statements that are promulgated without notice-and-comment, are accorded 
affecting only inmates are exempt from state administrative procedure acts, visitation restrictions 
are not exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking because they affect visitors as well as 
prisoners). 
 274. Lee, supra note 12, at 1752-53, 1773 (arguing that “formal speech policies” in 
government institutions such as prisons do not merit judicial deference unless they “result from an 
open and deliberative process,” including “reasonable notice and an opportunity to comment,” and 
suggesting that this will not be true in prison systems that are exempt from notice-and-comment 
rulemaking); Cf. WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 320 (2003) (arguing 
in the federal APA context that interpretive rules should receive less deference from courts than 
substantive rules because they have not “survived the fire of notice and comment”). 
 275. Giles, supra note 88, at 85. 
 276. Before the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) was amended by the 
PLRA, it required prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies only when those administrative 
procedures were certified as “plain, speedy, and effective,” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1)(2009).  See 
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523-24 (2002). 
 277. Cf. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361 (1996) (emphasizing the need for “local 
experimentation” and “adequate consideration [for] the views of state prison authorities”); Preiser 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973) (“It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has 
a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and 
procedures, than the administration of its prisons.”). 
 278. See 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 8351 (4th ed. 2008) (“When a regulation affects fundamental rights, review will be 
more searching and will assure that the rule is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.”). See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (Substantive due process 
“forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all . . . unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); Preminger v. Sec’y of 
Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1305, 1310-11 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e review the 
constitutionality of a regulation without deference to the agency.”).  See also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) 
(2006) (directing courts to invalidate any agency action “contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege or immunity”); BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 9.2.12(a), at 573-74 (explaining that section 
5-116 of the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act “provides that an agency rule is 
invalid if the rule is unconstitutional on its face or as applied”). 
 279. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 6.4, at 325. 
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deference based on their “power to persuade.”280  Factors in this analysis 
include “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.”281  In 
the corrections context as well, it makes sense to reward transparent and 
participatory rulemaking processes with deference and subject rules issued 
under more opaque and informal processes to greater scrutiny. 
B.  Anticipating Criticisms of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking. 
A number of criticisms may be leveled at the notion of subjecting prison 
and jail regulation to the requirements of state administrative procedure acts.  
Some might fear that further bureaucratic requirements will undermine prison 
security.  However, regulations governing many high risk industries and 
activities—including highway safety,282 emissions policies,283 and drug 
approval284—are promulgated through normal administrative procedure act-
type proceedings. 
Another criticism is that promulgating corrections rules under notice-and-
comment procedures is simply impractical.  Prison officials might get bogged 
down in paperwork.285  There are just too many rules governing prisons and 
jails, this argument goes, and corrections agencies are too intimately involved 
in the lives of prisoners to make rules under notice-and-comment 
procedures.286  A related argument is that members of the public are not 
“directly affected” by prison rules and such rules are better left to prison 
officials who have corrections expertise.287
To the extent that members of the public were not affected by prison rules 
when the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act was promulgated, it 
is much less true today, given skyrocketing incarceration rates.  As discussed in 
this Article, mass incarceration directly affects millions of prisoners and, by 
extension, their families and communities.  Now more than ever, there is a need 
 280. Id. § 6.4, at 325, 335. 
 281. Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of [rulings, interpretations, 
and opinions of the agency] will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”).  See also United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (“[A]n agency’s interpretation may merit some deference 
whatever its form, given the ‘specialized experience and broader investigations and information’ 
available to the agency.”). 
 282. Cf. JERRY MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 10-11 
(1990) (describing NHTSA rulemaking history and movement away from rulemaking and towards 
reliance on auto recalls). 
 283. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 284. Cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
 285. Adams v. Dep’t of Corr., 469 So.2d 164, 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (“[R]ulemaking 
was not intended to affect fundamental prison administration or inundate each prison 
superintendent with unrelenting paperwork.”). 
 286. BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 6.17.7, at 416. 
 287. Id. 
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for public participation in corrections rulemaking.  Public participation is 
especially important in areas like prisoner release, reentry, and medical and 
mental health care, all of which can have an impact on outside communities. 
Certainly, some states already engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking 
for many types of corrections regulations without apparent problem.288  To 
reduce administrative burden, state legislatures adopting notice-and-comment 
could limit the categories of corrections rules subject to rulemaking.  Public 
input could be restricted to policies that have the greatest impact on families, 
communities, and prisoners’ substantial rights.289  States abolishing blanket 
exemptions could also adopt pared-down procedures for corrections 
regulations.  The procedural complexity of state administrative procedure act 
notice-and-comment provisions vary widely, providing a number of models.290
Others might ask whether imposing more onerous rulemaking 
requirements on prison and jail regulation will prompt corrections officials to 
stop promulgating such regulations and revert to more informal policies.  For 
instance, the Supreme Court noted in Sandin that a constitutional due process 
analysis focused on the wording of corrections regulations produced 
“disincentives for States to codify prison management procedures.”291
Although this type of retrenchment may happen on the margins, 
corrections has become so professionalized over the past forty years that 
wholesale reversion to informal processes seems unlikely.292  Indeed, Feeley 
and Swearingen have written that “no one—prison inmate or correctional 
officer alike—would now seriously entertain the idea of turning back the clock 
to the pre-bureaucratic prison [because] the awesome new problems 
 288. For example, the CDCR web site lists policies that are pending notice-and-comment.  
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Regulations/Adult_Operations/Pending_Rules_Page.html (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2009).  Proposed rule changes are also listed on the Wisconsin Department of Corrections 
web site, http://www.wi-doc.com/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).  On the Wisconsin experience with 
corrections rule-making, see Walter J. Dickey, The Promise and Problems of Rulemaking in 
Corrections: The Wisconsin Experience, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 285, 304-22 (1983) (describing initial 
experience of corrections rulemaking under state Administrative Procedure Act during four-year 
period beginning in 1978, and identifying benefits including “clear identification of program 
objectives,” reduction of unwarranted complexity in rules, “revision of policy to comply with 
existing legal requirements,” and “more effective training of correctional staff”). 
 289. Cf. Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (concluding that 
Board of Parole rules were subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking because they “substantially 
affect[] the rights of persons subject to agency regulations”); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, 
§§ 6.3-6.4, at 316-49 (distinguishing between “legislative” rules, which are subject to notice-and-
comment rulemaking and have the force of law, and “interpretive” rules and policy statements). 
 290. Contrast CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11346.9(a)(3) (West 2005) (requiring “a summary of each 
objection or recommendation made regarding the specific adoption, amendment, or repeal 
proposed, together with an explanation of how the proposed action has been changed to 
accommodate each objection or recommendation, or the reasons for making no change”), with 
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-113 to -114 (LexisNexis 2004) (requiring that a unit indicate 
changes in the text of a proposed or adopted regulation). 
 291. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995). 
 292. See supra notes 51-53. 
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confronting prisons can be handled as well as they have been only as a 
consequence of the enhanced capacities brought about by increased 
bureaucratization.”293  Other forces bolster professionalization; federal statutes 
like the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) provide incentives for the 
promulgation of policies,294 as do professional accreditation organizations.295
More generally, administrative law scholars have warned that rulemaking 
procedures can lead to “ossification” or even “petrification,” causing agencies 
to cease issuing or amending rules.296  This might be the result if legislatures 
impose onerous rulemaking requirements, or reviewing courts require detailed 
statements of reasons.297  Possible ways of addressing this problem include 
designing a notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure for the corrections 
context that includes only critical elements or limiting judicial review.298  It 
seems unlikely, however, that courts will impose overly rigorous requirements 
on corrections officials, given the long-standing norm of nearly complete 
deference. 
There is also reason to think that the rulemaking process in the corrections 
context would be simpler than in other administrative law contexts.  Unlike 
other regulated areas,299 there are relatively few well-funded and powerful 
interests groups in corrections (guards’ unions being one),300 which would 
reduce the complexity and potential for abuse of the notice-and-comment 
process.301  State corrections rules are unlikely to be the subject of thousands of 
 293. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 51, at 470-71. 
 294. See also Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 51, at 451 (discussing how federal statutes 
like the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) and the Violent Crime and Law 
Enforcement Act of (1994) provide national standards for corrections and promote 
professionalization). 
 295. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 21, at 162-63. 
 296. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.11, at 511-13; MASHAW & HARFST, supra 
note 282, at 10-11, 172-201 (describing rulemaking deadlock at NHTSA); Richard J. Pierce, 
Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 185, 195-96 (1996) (quoting 
Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1385 (1992)). 
 297. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.8, at 492-96. 
 298. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.12, at 369 (“If the Court perceives value in rules 
and wants to preserve rulemaking as a tool potentially available to agencies, it must limit the 
power of lower courts to compel agencies to accompany rules with detailed and encyclopedic 
discussions of all issues, comments, data disputes, and alternatives.”). 
 299. Thomas O. McGarity, supra note 296, at 1397 (explaining that informal rulemaking has 
provided “powerful political constituencies” with “ample opportunity to mobilize against” 
proposed rules, and that “regulatees and their trade associations,” as well as “environmental and 
consumer groups” have “fiercely resisted the rulemaking process, seeking to lard it up with 
procedural, structural, and analytical trappings that have the predictable effect of slowing down 
the agency”). 
 300. See GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG, supra note 5, at 125 (describing the role of the 
California prison guards’ union in advocating the expansion of the California prison system).  Cf.  
Dolovich, supra note 123, at 523-24 (discussing lobbying efforts by private corrections 
companies). 
 301. See BONFIELD, supra note 138, § 2.1.2, at 31 (noting that state agencies on the whole 
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pages of comments by hundreds of sophisticated parties, like in EPA or FDA 
rulemaking proceedings.302  Using online procedures could also simplify the 
process, while simultaneously increasing transparency and opportunities for 
participation.303
A different type of concern is that by focusing on the regulation of mass 
incarceration, we inadvertently strengthen an ever more bureaucratized prison 
system, one that is clothed with an illusion of legitimacy.304  Certainly, the 
existence of regulations alone does not guarantee good implementation, and the 
proliferation of bureaucratic procedures can in fact undermine effective 
management.305  Bad actors will no doubt ignore policies.306  Nonetheless, 
many commentators have concluded that, on balance, increased bureaucracy 
protects prisoners and improves their living conditions, albeit at the cost of 
some flexibility.307
A related danger is that, while notice-and-comment rulemaking may be 
officially required, in actuality, it may be circumvented or gutted.308  For 
example, Feeley and Swearingen surveyed the CDCR rulemaking process and 
found that the CDCR overused exceptions to California Administrative 
deal with less affluent people, who are often not represented by lawyers). 
 302. Cf. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 117, § 7.4, at 444 (describing rulemaking proceedings 
in federal agencies). 
 303. See Barbara H. Brandon & Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and Other Tools for 
Strengthening Our Civil Infrastructure, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1421, 1442-43 (2002) (discussing 
increased transparency and exchange of information as among the benefits of online rulemaking).  
See, e.g., New Jersey Department of Corrections’ Home Page, http://www.state.nj.us/corrections 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2009). 
 304. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 51, at 468 (noting that “there is an irony in . . . seeking 
to protect individual rights by strengthening prison administration”). 
 305. The National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) has stated that the 
Michigan Department of Corrections medical system was “one of the most bureaucratic systems 
we have ever encountered,” to the detriment of its ability to provide adequate health care.  See 
Alexander, supra note 169, at 14. 
 306. See, e.g., Stewart v. Lyles, 66 Fed. App’x 18, 20 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing how 
corrections officers at the Illinois Stateville prison conducted strip and body cavity searches on 
male prisoners in front of other inmates and female supervisors, and when told of a policy 
forbidding such searches, the officers said that they did not “care about the paper,” until a female 
supervisor intervened on the prisoners’ behalf). 
 307. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 51, at 468.  See also Sturm, supra note 48, at 49 
(“Many scholars argue that the move toward bureaucracy has led to safer, less arbitrary, and more 
human institutions.”). 
 308. I thank faculty reviewer Malcolm Feeley for pushing my thinking on this point and for 
sharing his unpublished manuscript with the results of his study, Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 
154.  See also Marjorie Cohn, The Evisceration of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Wake of 
September 11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1234, 1244 (2003) (describing how then-
Attorney General Ashcroft promulgated, without notice-and-comment, “emergency interim” BOP 
regulation permitting government to eavesdrop on attorney-client conversations); Susan N. 
Herman, Introduction: David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium: Our New Federalism? 
National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1201, 1223 
(2004) (describing how, in the wake of 9/11, INS Commissioner, without notice-and-comment, 
“signed an emergency interim regulation superseding state law by prohibiting state jail officials 
from disclosing the identities of the detainees held on behalf of the INS”). 
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Procedure Act rulemaking.309  Local rules are completely exempt from the 
California Administrative Procedure Act and emergency rules are exempt for 
160 days.310  Between 1996 and 1999, the CDCR passed 76% of its rules 
through the emergency procedure,311 a troublingly high percentage.  In 
response, the California Law Revision Commission recommended that 
emergency rules be subjected to review by the Office of Administrative 
Law.312  Subsequently, in the period from 2005 to 2007, the percentage of rules 
adopted through the emergency procedure dropped to 20%.313
On the other hand, some might argue that more formal rulemaking 
procedures ultimately will limit prison officials’ ability to exercise judgment.  
Administrative law scholars have described the trade-offs of limiting 
discretion.314  An often-criticized example of an effort to restrict discretion and 
promote transparency in the criminal justice realm was sentencing reform.  In 
the 1980s, the federal system, followed by many states, implemented 
sentencing guidelines.315  Although liberal reformers had championed 
guidelines as a means of reducing unwarranted disparity,316 a byproduct of this 
set of reforms was increased harshness and the elimination of judges’ ability to 
grant individualized mercy.317  Certainly, there is danger in reducing individual 
discretion.  However, prison and jail systems already have policies and 
regulations; this Article argues that those regulations should be subject to 
greater public input.  Moreover, sentencing reform was accompanied by other 
measures that ratcheted up sentences, including mandatory minimums and 
“three-strikes” statutes, at a moment when America was bent on exacting 
punishment.318  There is no inherent reason why greater rationality should 
produce increased harshness. 
 309. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 154, at 31-38. 
 310. Id. at 29-30. 
 311. Id. at 37. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 25 (1969) (describing the 
importance and danger of discretion in a criminal justice context). 
 315. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative 
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993). 
 316. Stith & Koh, supra note 315, at 226-30 (describing how “liberal reformers” advocated 
replacing indeterminate sentencing with sentencing guidelines). 
 317. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1956 (1988) (“To rectify the guidelines’ 
principal shortcomings, the Commission should propose to Congress specific amendments 
designed to increase judges’ discretion to consider a broad range of individual offender 
characteristics.”).  Of course, the guidelines were later declared advisory by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (concluding that the mandatory nature of the 
sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment). 
 318. See ELSNER, supra note 77, at 18-23 (describing the combined effects of the “war on 
drugs,” mandatory minimum sentences, and “three-strikes” laws); MARC MAUER, THE RACE TO 
INCARCERATE 56-78 (1999) (describing how the “tough on crime” movement of the Reagan/Bush 
years continued through the Clinton administration). 
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Exempting corrections regulation from important mechanisms of public 
oversight deprives us of a much-needed accountability mechanism.319  The 
point is not to increase the sheer volume of regulation, but to enact policies 
through transparent mechanisms with opportunity for public input.  The need 
for public accountability is particularly great in what Justice Kennedy has 
described as the “hidden world of punishment.”320  Former Oklahoma Warden 
Jack Conley told the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons 
that “[w]hen we are not held accountable, the culture inside the prisons 
becomes a place that is so foreign to the culture of the real world that we 
develop our own ways of doing things.”321
Of course, greater opportunities for public participation will not 
necessarily translate into more enlightened corrections regulations.  Our current 
policy of mass incarceration illustrates this point: Commentators have 
described how criminal punishment has become more punitive since the 1960s, 
fueled in part by racial fears and stereotypes.322  However, eliminating 
democratic participation is not the solution to this problem.  The answer is 
“more politics”323—to engage in the administrative process and facilitate the 
participation of relatively disadvantaged affected communities in commenting 
on corrections policy. 
Nonetheless, some might counter (with considerable force) that only 
decarceration will solve the problems of America’s prisons.324  With America’s 
 319. COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, CONFRONTING 
CONFINEMENT 79-88 (2006), available at http://www.prisoncommission.org/pdfs/Confronting_C 
onfinement.pdf (discussing need for both external oversight and internal accountability measures). 
 320. Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 
9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html, in 
TRAVIS, supra note 1, at 3.  Cf. Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the 
Logic of Sovereignty and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 412-13 (June 2008) 
(describing a “legal borderland” as a place where “meaningful constraints on officials meet their 
limits”). 
 321. COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 319, at 6.  
Margaret Winter, Associate Director of the ACLU National Prison Project, told the Commission 
that what prisons need is “light, light, and more light.”  Id. at 77.  In its report, the Commission 
recommended additional measures to ensure accountability.  Id. at 6-7. 
 322. See Steven E. Barkan & Steven F. Cohn, Why Whites Favor Spending More Money to 
Fight Crime: The Role of Racial Prejudice, 52 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 300, 301, 310 (2005) 
(summarizing research suggesting that public opinion and specifically racial prejudices motivated 
“get tough” crime policies, and analyzing data from the General Social Survey to conclude that 
racially prejudiced whites favor increased spending on crime control).  Thanks to Valerie Jenness 
for raising this point. 
 323. My thinking on this point was influenced by comments by James Forman, Jr., who made 
a plea for “more politics, less law” in presenting his paper Isolation, Empathy, and Crime, at the 
LatCrit XIV conference on Oct. 3, 2009. 
 324. Professor Todd Clear spoke of the need to focus on reversing mass incarceration.  Audio 
Recording: Symposium on The Road to Prison Reform: Treating the Causes and Conditions of 
Our Overburdened System, held by the Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal, (Feb. 6, 2009), 
available at http://www.law.uconn.edu/content/road-prison-reform (follow “Download the MP3” 
hyperlink under Panel 2).  See David Cole, Can Our Shameful Prisons Be Reformed? 56 NEW 
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imprisoned population topping the charts, we should focus on decarceration, 
rather than adjusting to a system of mass incarceration.325  Although there have 
been encouraging moves in that direction, accelerated by the cost burden of 
mass incarceration in the context of a global economic recession,326 the need 
for transparency in corrections policy-making persists, even if the United States 
pursues a policy of decarceration.  Until our reliance on mass incarceration is 
reduced, prison and jail regulations will continue to have a major impact on 
poor communities.  So long as prisons and jails exist, the policies that regulate 
them should be subject to public scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
Corrections regulations are administrative law incarcerated.  When we 
ignore corrections policies, we turn a blind eye to a body of law that directly 
governs millions of Americans.  If courts fail to analyze such rules with rigor, 
or delegate to them the final say over whether prisoners will be heard by courts, 
they reinforce the race, class, and gender hierarchies of mass incarceration.327  
These failings will surely haunt us, for the injustices done in prisons and jails 
can seep out.  With the world’s largest incarcerated population, we cannot 
countenance a “hands-off” doctrine in any form.  It is time that we subject 
prison and jail regulation to greater public scrutiny. 
YORK REV. BOOKS, November 19, 2009 (arguing for a reduction in the U.S. prison population on 
both practical and moral grounds).   See also Sylvia Rivera Law Project, supra note 249, at 5 
(“The more investment we as a society make in our prisons and jails and the less in real resources 
for our communities, the more human beings end up incarcerated and the more violence happens 
both inside and outside of correctional facilities.”). 
 325. Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron 
Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 316-24 (2009) (urging sentencing 
reform to reduce the number of people who go to prison and the length of time they stay there).  
See also MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS (2005); Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the 
Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1696 (2006) (“My 
vision of penal reform is premised on not just halting the expansion of the carceral state but on 
dismantling it.”); David Rudovsky, A Closing Keynote: A Comment on Mass Incarceration in the 
United States, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 207, 214 (2009) (“We ought to be doing more than just 
tinkering at the edges.”). 
 326. On August 4, 2009, a panel of three federal judges ordered the CDCR to reduce its 
prison population by nearly 43,000 prisoners, concluding that overcrowding stemming from 
“tough-on-crime politics” had created unconstitutional conditions in the system.  Coleman v. 
Schwarzenegger, No. Civ. S-90-0520, 2009 WL 2430820, at *115-16 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009); 
Carol J. Williams, State gets Two Years to Cut 43,000 from Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at 
A1.  Changes are being discussed in Washington, D.C. as well.  On March 26, 2009, Senator Jim 
Webb introduced a bill in the U.S. Senate to establish a commission to overhaul America’s 
criminal justice system and reduce our reliance on incarceration, the National Criminal Justice 
Commission Act of 2009, S. 714, 111th Cong. (2009).  Senator Webb’s website cites the fact that 
the U.S. has 5% of the world’s population, but 25% of the incarcerated prisoners, and states that 
“America’s criminal justice system has deteriorated to the point that it is a national disgrace.”  
http://webb.senate.gov/email/criminaljusticereform.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009). 
 327. Cf. Buchanan, supra note 8, at 49-50; Siegel, supra note 82, at 2119-20; Loury, supra 
note 9, at 36-37. 
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APPENDIX 
 










ALA. CODE § 41-22-3(9)(g)(1) (2000): The 
term “rule” does not include rules relating to 
“the conduct of inmates of public institutions 
and prisoners on parole.”329
Alaska Bound by 
rulemaking 
The Commissioner may adopt “regulations,” 
under sections 44.28.030 and 33.30.021 of 
the Alaska Statute,330 which are defined 
under the Alaska Administrative Procedure 
Act and subject to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.  ALASKA STAT. § 
44.62.640(a)(3) (2008).  The Commissioner 
may also direct the development of a manual 
of “policies and procedures,” ALASKA 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 05.155 (2004), which 
are not subject to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking,331 and which address many 
 
 328. The chart characterizes corrections rules as “exempt” or “partially exempt” if there is an 
argument that they are exempt from rulemaking procedures under the state administrative 
procedure act.  It should not be interpreted as a definitive statement that all corrections regulations 
are exempt from state administrative procedure act requirements.  Jurisdictions that are described 
as “bound” are those that require a tier of rules be promulgated as regulations pursuant to notice-
and-comment rulemaking.  Those jurisdictions might also have other corrections policies—
perhaps more numerous and equally important—that are not subject to the provisions of the state 
administrative procedure act. 
 329. See Gerthoffer v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 973 So.2d 355, 358-59 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) 
(discussing Alabama Code, ALA. CODE § 41-22-3(9)(g)(1) (2000), exemption). 
 330. ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.28.030, 33.30.021 (2008).  See McGinnis v. Stevens, 570 P.2d 
735, 741 (Alaska 1977) (Commissioner is “under a legislative mandate” to promulgate regulations 
governing Alaska’s prisons.). 
 331. Wilson v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 127 P.3d 826, 828-29 (Alaska 2006) (“When an 
administrative regulation is adopted under statutory authority, we review the regulation to 
determine whether it is ‘consistent with and reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of the 
statutory provisions conferring rule-making authority on the agency’ and whether it is ‘reasonable 
and not arbitrary’ considering the legislative purpose.”); Mathis v. Sauser, 942 P.2d 1117, 1123 
nn.12-13 (Alaska 1997) (“Policies and procedures of state agencies need not conform to formal 
requirements of the APA.”).  See also Moody v. State, Dep’t of Corr., No. S-12303, 2007 WL 
3197938, at *1 (Alaska 2007) (Alaska Administrative Procedure Act does not permit judicial 
review of DOC administrative decision, but court will review “fundamental constitutional 
question[s]”). 





State Administrative Procedure Act exempts 
any “rule or substantive policy statement 
concerning inmates or committed youth of a 
correctional or detention facility.”332
Arkansas Bound by state 
Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Bound by the state Administrative Procedure 
Act.333
California Express partial 
exemption from 
rulemaking 
Rules of “general application” are subject to 
State Administrative Procedure Act 
procedures, see CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11346 et 
seq. (West 2005), while rules that affect only 
a single institution may be exempt.334  See 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 5058(c) (West 2008) 
(“The following are deemed not to be 
‘regulations’ as defined in Section 11342.600 
of the Government Code: (1) Rules issued by 
the director applying solely to a particular 
prison or other correctional facility, provided 
that the following conditions are met: (A) All 
 
 332. ARIZ. STAT. § 41-1005(A)(7) (2004).  See also Stanhope v. State, 825 P.2d 25, 26 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that a prisoner classification decision is not “subject to judicial review 
under the Arizona Administrative Review Act”).  But see Malumphy v. MacDougall, 610 P.2d 
1044 (Ariz. 1980) (DOC regulations dealing with inmate classification are not just “internal” 
because “the unfiled regulations materially affect the type of existence a sentenced prisoner will 
endure, which ranges from ‘intensive’ custody, twenty-four-hour lockup, to ‘trusty.’  Regulations 
of this type which affect such important interests are the type of regulations which must be filed 
with the Secretary of State.”); Wilkinson v. State, 838 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) 
(“The DOC’s religious visitation rules concern not just the inmates, but also the religious leaders 
who visit them.”). 
 333. Eldridge v. Bd. of Corr., 768 S.W.2d 534, 535-36 (Ark. 1989) (“[T]he Administrative 
Procedure Act . . . applies to the various boards, commissions, departments, officers, or other 
authorities of the State of Arkansas, with such exceptions as are set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 25-
15-202(1)(B).  The Department of Correction is not excepted and is therefore subject to the Act.”  
However, the selection of a site for a correctional facility was not a “rule” within the meaning of 
the Act.).  But see Ark. Dep’t of Corr. v. Williams, No. 08-1031 (Ark. Oct. 29, 2009) (noting that 
the Arkansas legislature amended section 5-4-617 of the Arkansas Code to exempt lethal injection 
protocols from the state Administrative Procedure Act); Clinton v. Bonds, 816 S.W.2d 169, 171 
(Ark. 1991) (ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-212(a) (2002): judicial review of contested cases is not 
available to inmates, but Arkansas Supreme Court says inmates have a right to review of 
fundamental constitutional questions.). 
 334. Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (Lethal 
injection protocol is “regulation” within the meaning of state Administrative Procedure Act and 
does not fall within “single prison” or “internal management” exceptions); Stoneham v. Rushen, 
203 Cal. Rptr. 20, 22-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“standardized classification point-scoring system” 
was a rule that had to be promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act; 
judicial review was to determine whether regulation was within scope of agency’s statutory 
authority and for arbitrariness). 
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rules that apply to prisons or other 
correctional facilities throughout the state are 
adopted by the director pursuant to Chapter 
3.5 . . . (B) All rules except those that are 
excluded from disclosure to the public . . . are 
made available to all inmates confined in the 
particular prison or other correctional facility 
to which the rules apply and to all members 




COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-1-111 (2008): “The 
provisions of this title relating to the 
placement, assignment, management, 
discipline, and classification of inmates shall 
not be subject to section 24-4-103 
[rulemaking], 24-4-105 [hearings], or 24-4-
106 [judicial review], C.R.S.” 
Colo. Dep’t of Corr., Administrative 
Regulation 100-01 (April 15, 2009), 
available at 
https://exdoc.state.co.us/userfiles/regulations/
pdf/0100_01.pdf: “All ARs are policies and 
guidelines only; therefore, they are exempt 
under Title 24 of the Colorado Revised 
Statutes, unless specifically stated in an AR 
that it is subject to a public hearing.” 
Connecticut Express partial 
exemption from 
rulemaking 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-166(13) (West 
2007): The term “regulation” “does not 
include (A) statements concerning only the 
internal management of any agency and not 
affecting private rights or procedures 
available to the public . . . .”336
§ 18-78a (West 2006): The state 
Administrative Procedure Act “shall apply to 
 
 335. Also exempt are short-term criteria for placing inmates in new facilities or facilities 
subject to closure and issues relating to security and investigations.  CAL. PENAL CODE 
§5058(c)(2)-(3) (West 2008).  Compare Faunce v. Denton, 213 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985) (holding that rules regarding the amount of property prisoners could have in their cells were 
rules of general application affecting population of men in custody and so subject to the state 
Administrative Procedure Act), with In re Garcia, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
(holding that correspondence regulation was a local regulation exempt from the Administrative 
Procedure Act). 
 336. Pierce v. Lantz, 965 A.2d 576, 579-81 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (concluding that DOC 
regulations regarding censorship of “sexually explicit materials and compact discs with parental 
advisory stickers” and price mark-ups on items in prison commissary were not “rules” within the 
meaning of section 4-166(13) of the Connecticut Statute). 
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the Department of Correction, except that in 
adopting regulations in regard to riot control 
procedures, security and emergency 
procedures, disciplinary action or 
classification the Department of Correction 
shall not be required to follow the procedures 
in sections 4-168, 4-168a, 4-168b, 4-172, 4-
173, 4-174 and 4-176. The Attorney General, 
the legislative regulation review committee 
and the General Assembly, in complying 
with their duties in accordance with sections 
4-169, 4-170 and 4-171, shall not make such 
regulations in regard to riot control 
procedures and security and emergency 
procedures public.”337
Section 4-166(2) also excludes Department 
of Correction hearings from the definition of 




DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4322(d) (2001): 
The “Department of Correction Policies and 
Procedures, including any Policy, Procedure, 
Post Order, Facility Operational Procedure or 
Administrative Regulation adopted by a 
Bureau, facility or department of the 
Department of Correction shall be 
confidential, and not subject to disclosure 






D.C. CODE § 24-211.02 (2001): “The 
Department of Corrections with the approval 
of the Council of the District of Columbia 
shall have power to promulgate rules and 
regulations for the government of such 
institutions and to establish and conduct 
industries, farms, and other activities, to 
classify the inmates, and to provide for their 
proper treatment, care, rehabilitation, and 
 
 337. Beasley v. Comm’r of Corr., 718 A.2d 487, 495 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998). 
 338. Jackson v. Danberg, C.A. No. 07M-09-141 RRC, 2008 WL 1850585 (Del. Super. Ct. 
2008), aff’d, 962 A.2d 256 (Del. 2008) (noting that the DOC has never promulgated a regulation 
under the state Administrative Procedure Act). 
 339. Cf. Walton v. District of Columbia, 670 A.2d 1346 (D.C. 1996) (discussing Lorton 
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reformation.”339  But Program Statements for 
the D.C. DOC are not subject to notice-and-





Provisions of section 120.54 of the Florida 
Statute (Rulemaking) apply to Department of 
Corrections with respect to rules of general 
applicability,340 but not rules affecting only a 
single facility.341  There is no judicial review 






The “Board of Corrections and its penal 
institutions” are exempt from the definition 





Exempt under section 91-1(4) of the Hawaii 
Statute.  HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-1(4) 
(LexisNexis 2007) (The term “rule” does not 
include “regulations concerning only the 
internal management of an agency and not 
affecting private rights of or procedures 
available to the public”).343





IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-212 (1997): “The 
state board of correction shall make all 
necessary rules . . . . All rules of the board 
shall be subject to the review of the 
legislature . . . .  But no other provisions of 
 
Regulations Approval Act). 
 340. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.54 (West 2008); Dep’t of Corr. v. Holland, 469 So. 2d 166, 167 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Policies that have “breath and application throughout the prison 
system” must be promulgated pursuant to § 120.54, but policy regarding winter clothes affecting 
only single prison was exempt.).  See also Osterback v. Agwunobi, 873 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004) (concluding that repeal of regulation regarding environmental conditions was invalid 
exercise of rulemaking authority); Alexander v. Singletary, 626 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1993) (Policy should have been adopted by rule.). 
 341. Adams v. Dep’t of Corr., 469 So. 2d 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Procedures 
regarding obtaining copies for prisoners need not be promulgated pursuant to state Administrative 
Procedure Act.). 
 342. Caldwell v. State, 821 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Quigley v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Corr., 745 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Hargrove v. Dep’t of Corr., 601 So. 2d 623 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Prisoner was limited to grievance system to challenge Florida 
Department of Corrections interpretation of its visitation rules.). 
 343. “The legislative history of [the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act] discloses that 
policy decisions regarding state penal institutions were considered to be regulations that involved 
only the internal management of these institutions.”  Tai v. Chung, 570 P.2d 563, 564 (Haw. 
1977). 
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chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, [Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act] shall apply to 
the board, except as otherwise specifically 
provided by statute.”  Also, section 67-
5201(2) provides that “agency” does not 
include “state board of correction.”  § 67-
5201(2) (1995). 
Illinois Bound by state 
Administrative 
Procedure Act 
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 850.120(c)-(d) 
(2002): contemplates rulemaking pursuant to 
the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-1 et seq. (2008).344  
But facility rules need not be promulgated 
under the state Administrative Procedure 
Act.345
Indiana Bound by 
rulemaking 
The Commissioner is authorized to adopt 
“departmental rules” under the state 
Administrative Procedure Act, IND. CODE 
ANN. § 11-8-2-5(b)(1) (West 2004), and is 
required to develop policies “for committed 
persons, for administration of facilities, and 
for conduct of employees,” § 11-8-2-
5(a)(8).346  But see § 4-21.5-2-5(6) (West 
2002) (exempting from the definition of 
“agency action” an “agency action related to 
an offender within the jurisdiction of the 
department of correction”). 
Iowa Express partial 
exemption from 
rulemaking 
Iowa Administrative Code, IOWA ADMIN. 
CODE r. 201-10.2(17A) (2009), sets out 
procedures for rulemaking by the Department 
of Corrections, but also recognizes an 
exemption in the Iowa Code, IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 17A.2(11)(k) (West 2005), which 
states that the term “rule” does not include 
 
 344. In one case, a court concluded that the director of the Department of Corrections had 
abused his discretion in refusing to grant good time credit based on an unwritten policy, saying it 
was in violation of rulemaking policies under the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, 
Corrections Code, and Administrative Code.  Guzzo v. Snyder, 762 N.E.2d 663, 667-68 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2002). 
 345. Cannon v. Quinley, 815 N.E.2d 443, 451-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
 346. But see Conquest v. State Employee’s Appeals Comm’n, 565 N.E.2d 1086 (Ind. 1991) 
(holding that a policy regarding hours for home visitation of parolees was not subject to 
requirements of state Administrative Procedure Act under section 4-22-2-13(c)(1) of the Indiana 
Code, which exempts rules which relate solely to internal policy, procedure, or organization. ). 
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“[a] statement concerning only inmates of a 
penal institution.”347
Kansas Express partial 
exemption from 
rulemaking 
Although Kansas corrections agencies are 
subject to the provisions of the rules and 
regulations filing act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-
437 (1997), the state Administrative 
Procedure Act rulemaking provisions exempt 
rules that “relate[] to the emergency or 
security procedures of a correctional 
institution,” § 77-415(4)(f).  Orders of 
wardens also are exempt from an alternate 
modified rulemaking procedure for rules 
exempted from normal rulemaking.  § 77-
421a (providing that “[t]his section shall not 
apply to orders issued by directors of 
correctional institutions under KSA § 75-
5256 [orders of wardens]”).348  Another 
provision which exempts any rule or 
regulation which “[r]elates to the internal 
management or organization of the agency,” 
§ 77-415(4)(a), has been interpreted to 
exempt some corrections rules.349  Section 
77-603(c)(2) further provides that the Kansas 
judicial review act does not apply to agency 
actions “concerning the management, 
discipline or release of persons in the custody 
of the secretary of corrections.” 
Kentucky Bound by 
rulemaking 
The Secretary of the Department of 
Corrections is entrusted with the authority to 
promulgate “administrative regulations,” KY. 
 
 347. See also Wycoff v. Iowa Dist. Court, 580 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1998) (IAPA has no 
application to prison disciplinary hearings.).  But see Brummer v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 661 
N.W.2d 167, 168 n.1 (Iowa 2003) (reviewing Department of Corrections sex offender evaluation 
under judicial review provision of Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, IOWA CODE ANN. § 
17A.19 (West 2005)). 
 348. However, section 77-421(b) of the Kansas statute provides that the Department of 
Corrections may permit inmates to be heard regarding a proposed rule or regulation that is the 
subject of hearings under this section, although it is not required to do so.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-
421(b) (1997). 
 349. See Vinson v. McKune, 960 P.2d 222 (Kan. 1998) (Rules regarding offender privileges 
are exempt.).  See also Gilmore v. McKune, 940 P.2d 78, 83 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (“Under K.S.A. 
77-421a, orders issued by the director of a correctional facility are not subject to the filing and 
publication requirements of K.S.A. 77-415 et seq., before taking effect.  However, K.S.A. 1996 
Supp. 75-5256(b) requires that the warden’s orders, other than those relating to emergency or 
security procedures, be published and made available to all inmates.”). 
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REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 197.020, 196.035 
(LexisNexis 1999), which are defined in 
Chapter 13A of the Kentucky Statute, and 
promulgated under the rulemaking 
procedures of that section.  The Department 
of Corrections also has a Policies & 
Procedures Manual, which is incorporated by 
reference into the Kentucky Administrative 
Regulations, 501 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 6:020 
(2008), and which is developed internally, 
available at 
http://www.corrections.ky.gov/about/chapter.
htm.350  Requirements of the state 
Administrative Procedure Act regarding 
administrative hearings do not apply to 
prison adjustment or grievance hearings.  KY. 





Policies that apply only to a particular 
institution are exempt,352 but other policies 
constitute “rules” within the meaning of the 
state Administrative Procedure Act.353
Maine Bound by 
rulemaking 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 1402 
(1988): The commissioner shall establish 
rules in accordance with the Maine 
Administrative Procedure Act, title 5, chapter 
375.  But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 
9051 (2002) (stating that adjudicatory 
proceedings “involving correctional 
 
 350. But see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.020(3) (LexisNexis 1999) (“The department may 
promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to implement a 
program that provides for reimbursement of telehealth consultations.”). 
 351. But see Hughes v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2007-CA-001068-MR, 2008 WL 1921627, at 
*2 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (“Kentucky has developed a standard of ‘some evidence’ for judicial 
review of prison disciplinary proceedings.”). 
 352. Peterson v. Michael, 960 So.2d 1260 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (“[A] posted policy for a 
particular facility, like DWCC’s Posted Policy #53 [relating to “strip cell” procedure], does not 
have to be formally promulgated in the Louisiana Register.”). 
 353. Hills v. Cain, 764 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (Institution’s policy that an 
inmate must “specifically request that a tape recording be preserved for possible judicial review of 
a disciplinary action” is a “rule” within the meaning of Louisiana Statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
49:951(6) (2003)); Rivera v. State, 727 So. 2d 609, 612-13 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (Department failed 
to follow Administrative Procedure Act in issuing disciplinary rules); Sims v. Wackenhut, 708 So. 
2d 1140, 1141 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (“The Department of Public Safety and Corrections operates 
according to rules and regulations that it promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure 
Act.”). 
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facilities” are not covered by the provisions 




The Department of Public Safety and 
Correctional Services and DOC are subject to 
the provisions of the Maryland 
Administrative Procedure Act,354 but the 
exemption for rules affecting “internal 
management” can encompass “the myriad of 
rules governing the details of prison life.”355








MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 1A 
(West 2001): “The department of correction 
shall be subject to sections one through eight, 
inclusive, and shall not otherwise be subject 
to this chapter . . . .” The non-exempt 
sections include rulemaking and judicial 
review of regulations, but not adjudicative 
proceedings. 
Michigan Bound by 
rulemaking 
MDOC Policy Directive 01.04.110 states that 
administrative rules are promulgated under 
the Administrative Procedure Act and have 
the force of law.356  Policy Directives clarify 
and implement administrative rules and are 
signed by the director.  There are 189 policy 




MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.03, subd. 3(b)(1) 
(West 2005): Definition of a “rule” for 
purposes of the administrative procedure 
 
 354. Massey v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 886 A.2d 585, 602 (Md. 2005).  
See also Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25, 76-81 (Md. 2006) (recognizing that DPSCS and DOC are 
subject to provisions of state Administrative Procedure Act, and that exemption exists for rules 
that do not have “general application,” concern “only the internal management of DOC,” and do 
not “directly affect the rights of the public,” but concluding that lethal injection protocol is not 
exempt); Watkins v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 831 A.2d 1079, 1086 (Md. 
2003) (“The Administrative Procedure Act governs our review of decisions of the Grievance 
Office, an entity within the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services.”). 
 355. Massey, 886 A.2d at 602. 
 356. Inmates are also members of the public and so prison disciplinary rules are subject to the 
state Administrative Procedure Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.207(g) (West 2004).  Martin 
v. Dep’t of Corr., 384 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1986).  See also Spruyette v. Owens, 475 N.W. 2d 382, 
386 (Ct. App. Mich. 1991) (“Both this court and our Supreme Court have repeatedly held that the 
Department of Corrections is an agency subject to the rule-making provisions of the act,” and so 
hearing officer who acted based on an “improperly promulgated policy directive” was not entitled 
to qualified immunity).  But see Walen v. Dep’t of Corr., 505 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. 1993) 
(concluding that FOIA applies to prison disciplinary proceedings despite the fact that the 
legislature had exempted such hearings from the definition of “contested case” in some portions of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.315(2) (West 2004)). 
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does not include “rules of the commissioner 
of corrections relating to the release, 
placement, term, and supervision of inmates 
serving a supervised release or conditional 
release term, the internal management of 
institutions under the commissioner’s 
control, and rules adopted under section 
609.105 governing the inmates of those 
institutions.”357
Mississippi  Express 
exemption from 
rulemaking 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-43-1.102(i)(ii)(6) 
(West 2006) (exempting from definition of 
“rule” “[a] regulation or statement directly 





Section 536.010(6)(k) of the Missouri Statute 
exempts from the definition of “rule” a 
“statement concerning only inmates of an 
institution under the control of the 
department of corrections and human 
resources or the division of youth 
services.”359  MO. ANN. STAT. § 






Mont. Dep’t of Corr., Policy No. 20.2.101 
(Jan. 14, 2000), available at 
http://www.mtrules.org/gateway/RuleNo.asp
?RN=20.2.101: “[T]he department of 
corrections is exempt from the Montana 
Administrative Procedure Act in the areas of 
the supervision and administration of any 
 
 357. Weber v. Hvass, 626 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that a rule 
recovering the cost of confinement from inmates was exempt from the state Administrative 
Procedure Act).  See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.03, subd. 2 (West 2005) (providing that “[t]he 
contested case procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . do not apply to . . . the 
commissioner of corrections”). 
 358. Mississippi courts provide judicial review of some MDOC administrative decisions.  
See, e.g., Horton v. Epps, No. 2008-CP-00430-COA, 2009 WL 1058631 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) 
(judicial review of determination regarding trustee status); Lyons v. Epps, No. 2007-CP-01194-
COA, 2009 WL 920633 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (judicial review of sentence computation denied 
for failure to timely file appeal). 
 359. Middleton v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 278 S.W.3d 193 (Mo. 2009) (Lethal injection protocol 
was exempt from provisions of state Administrative Procedure Act.)  “In order for there to be a 
‘contested case’ within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, providing for judicial 
review of an agency decision in a contested case, a prior hearing requirement must be imposed by 
statute, municipal charter ordinance or constitutional provision.”  State v. Brackman, 737 S.W.2d 
516, 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (Prison adjustment committee is not an “agency” and its decision to 
reclassify and transfer a prisoner was not a “contested case” subject to judicial review.). 
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penal institution with regard to the 
institutional supervision, custody, control, 
care and treatment of youths or prisoners . . . 
.” 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-102(2)(a)(ii) 
(2009): “‘Agency’ means an agency, as 
defined in 2-3-102, of the state government 
except that the provisions of this chapter do 
not apply to the following: . . . the 
supervision and administration of a penal 
institution with regard to the institutional 
supervision, custody, control, care, or 
treatment of youths or prisoners.” 
Nebraska Bound by 
rulemaking 
Bound by rulemaking procedures of 
Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act, 







“The following agencies are entirely 
exempted from the requirements of this 
chapter: . . . the Department of Corrections . . 







N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-H:8 (LexisNexis 
2008): “The commissioner shall . . . [a]dopt 
all rules of the department, pursuant to RSA 
541-A [Admin. Procedure Act], whether the 
rulemaking authority delegated by the 
legislature is granted to the commissioner, 
the department or any administrative unit or 
subordinate official of the department either 
by this chapter or by existing statutes.”  He 
shall also “adopt such reasonable internal 
practices and procedures, which shall not be 
considered rules subject to the provisions of 
RSA 541-A, as may be necessary to carry out 
the duties of the department and its 
 
 360. Abdullah v. Gunter, 497 N.W.2d 12, 16 (Neb. 1993) (concluding that inmate’s claim that 
policy was invalid because not properly promulgated in compliance with the Nebraska 
Administrative Procedure Act was moot because the policy subsequently was promulgated in 
accordance with the act).  See also Dailey v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 578 N.W.2d 869 (1998) 
(noting that judicial review of prison disciplinary hearings is provided under the state 
Administrative Procedure Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-4,123 (2008), although Administrative 
Procedure Act rules do not apply to disciplinary proceedings themselves). 
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divisions.”  See also § 541-A:21(I)(j), (aa) 
(LexisNexis 2006) (exempting from state 
Administrative Procedure Act rules relative 
“to credit for good conduct of prisoners” and 
“to internal practices and procedures in the 
department of corrections”).361
New Jersey Bound by 
rulemaking 
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:1-1.5(a) (2009): 
“Department of Corrections rules are 
promulgated pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq., 
and NJAC 1:30.”362
New Mexico Express partial 
exemption from 
rulemaking 
State Rules Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-2 
(LexisNexis 2003) states that the term rule 
does “not include rules relating to the 
management, confinement, discipline or 
release of inmates of any penal or charitable 
institution.”363  The New Mexico 
Administrative Procedure Act, N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 12-8-2(G)(3) (LexisNexis 1998), also 
provides that the term “rule” does not pertain 
to “regulations concerning only the 
management, confinement, discipline or 
release of inmates of state penal, correctional, 
public health or mental institutions.” 
New York Bound by 
rulemaking 
The New York State Administrative 
Procedure Act excludes “the state division of 
parole and the department of correctional 
services” from the definition of “agency,” 
 
 361. Knowles v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr. Comm’r, 538 F. Supp. 2d 453, 459 n.8 (D. N.H. 2008) 
(“In 2007, the New Hampshire Legislature enacted a statutory scheme which exempted certain of 
the DOC’s practices and procedures from the procedural requirements of the APA.”).  The year 
before this statutory revision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court had concluded that a 1994 
recodification had repealed an exemption for DOC policies, except for those “relative to credit for 
good conduct of prisoners,” an exception which included the disciplinary rules challenged in that 
case.  Gosselin v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 907 A.2d 944, 946-47 (N.H. 2006).  The Gosselin court 
interpreted Section 541-A:21 (I) to exempt authority granted under these provisions from both 
rulemaking and adjudicatory requirements of the state Administrative Procedure Act.  Id. at 947. 
 362. Hampton v. Dep’t of Corr., 765 A.2d 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (Regulations 
regarding custody classification were invalid because not promulgated pursuant to state 
Administrative Procedure Act.).  See also Maqbool v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 2008 WL 2356687 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (judicial review of a classification decision); Lewis v. Dep’t of 
Corr., 2007 WL 846335 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (judicial review of disciplinary 
proceeding). 
 363. See also Lopez v. LeMaster, 61 P.3d 185 (N.M. 2002) (limiting judicial review of prison 
disciplinary proceeding to constitutional due process violations); Johnson v. Francke, 734 P.2d 
804 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (exempting disciplinary rules from state rules act). 
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“except for purposes of article two of this 
chapter.”  N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 102(1) 
(McKinney 2009).  Article 2 addresses 
rulemaking procedures.  § 201. 
The New York State Administrative 
Procedure Act exempts from the definition of 
“rule” those rules “concerning the internal 
management of the agency which do not 
directly and significantly affect the rights of 
or procedures or practices available to the 
public.”  § 102.2(b)(i). 
However, this exception has been interpreted 
not to constitute an exemption for rules 
affecting prisoners in Jones v. Smith, 478 
N.E.2d 191, 191 (1985) (Disciplinary rules 
are not exempt from provisions of State 
Administrative Procedure Act, because 
regulations that affect a prisoner’s liberty 
interest are not matters of “organization” or 
“internal management,” and because 
prisoners were the members of the “general 
public” over which the Department exercises 
“direct authority”).364
Many administrative decisions of the N.Y. 
Dept. of Corrections, including prison 
disciplinary hearings, are reviewed under 








Section 150B-1(d)(6) of the North Carolina 
Statute exempts from rulemaking: “The 
Department of Correction, with respect to 
matters relating solely to persons in its 
custody or under its supervision, including 
prisoners, probationers, and parolees.”  N.C. 
 
 364. See also McAllister v. Jones, 514 N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (Failure to file a 
rule with the Secretary of State precluded basing a disciplinary procedure on it.).  But see Ciotoli 
v. Goord, 683 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (Because disciplinary rules regarding 
prisoner drug testing were “flexible” rather than “fixed” rules of “general principle,” they were not 
required to be filed with the Secretary of State); Abreu v. Coughlin, 555 N.Y.S.2d 889 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1990) (Urinalysis procedure form was not a “rule” within the meaning of the state 
Administrative Procedure Act.); Baker v. Scully, 550 N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (Time 
card rules and regulations need not be filed with Secretary of State). 
 365. Thanks to John Boston for sharing information about New York. 
2009] AD LAW INCARCERATED 389 
GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(d)(6) (2007).  Section 
150B-1(e)(7) also exempts the Department of 
Correction from the “contested case” 
provision of the state Administrative 
Procedure Act. 







“A rule concerning only inmates of a 
correctional or detention facility” is 
exempted from the North Dakota 
Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 28-32-01(11)(f) (1991).366  It 
also exempts from the definition of “agency” 
the “department of corrections and 
rehabilitation except with respect to the 
activities of the division of adult services 
under chapter 54-23.4 [crime victims 
compensation fund],” § 28-32-01(2)(m) 
(Supp. 2009). 
Ohio Bound by 
rulemaking 
Administrative regulations are subject to 
promulgation under Ohio Code, OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 119.03 (LexisNexis 2007), 
according to the Notice Procedure 5120:2-1-
01.  Policy Directives may be promulgated 
by the Commissioner, see Ohio Dep’t of 
Rehab. and Corr., Department Directive 01-






OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 250.4(A)(10) 
(West Supp. 2009): “The Department of 
Corrections, State Board of Corrections, 
county sheriffs and managers of city jails 
shall be exempt from Article I of the 
Administrative Procedures Act with respect 
to . . . prescribing internal management 
procedures for the management of the state 
 
 366. See Jensen v. Little, 459 N.W.2d 237, 239 (N.D. 1990) (“[W]e believe the Penitentiary’s 
disciplinary rules promulgated under the Director of Institutions are exempt from the procedures 
of the Administrative Agencies Practice Act.”). 
 367. See State v. Brown, 804 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (“This court has 
specifically found that the ODRC is not an agency whose decisions are subject to judicial review 
by appeal pursuant to RC 119.12.”).  But see Linger v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, No. 
97APE04-482, 1997 WL 638411, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (“Appellant is correct that some 
functions of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction are subject to R.C. Chapter 
119 [judicial review provisions of the state APA].”). 
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prisons, county jails and city jails and for the 
management, supervision and control of all 
incarcerated prisoners.”368
Oregon Bound by 
rulemaking 
Policy on Rules Development, No. 291-001-
0020, says that the DOC adopted the AG’s 
Model Rules of Procedure under the 
Administrative Procedure Act pursuant to 
ORS 183.341, and provides a list of agencies 
to which proposed rules are sent.369  But 
section 183.335(3)(c) of the Oregon Statute 
provides that “the Department of Corrections 
and the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison 
Supervision may adopt rules limiting 
participation by inmates in the proposed 
adoption, amendment or repeal of any rule to 
written submissions.”  OR. REV. STAT. § 
183.335(3)(c) (2007). 
Pennsylvania Bound by 
rulemaking 
Weaver v. Dep’t of Corr., 720 A.2d 178 (Pa. 
Cmlth. 1998) (rejecting claim that inmate 
medical services co-pay regulations were 
invalid, concluding that the Department of 
Corrections had complied with 
Commonwealth Documents Law and the 
Regulatory Review Act; noting the 
distinction between agency regulations that 
must be promulgated through rulemaking and 
policies, which need not).370
Rhode Island Partial 
exemption from 
rulemaking 
Subject to Administrative Procedure Act, R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 42-35-3 (2007), but there are 
exemptions because the term “rule” does not 
 
 368. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 250.4(B)(11) (West 2008): further exempts from Article II 
of the state Administrative Procedure Act, which deals with individual adjudication, “[t]he 
supervisory or administrative agency of any penal, mental, medical or eleemosynary institution, 
only with respect to the institutional supervision, custody, control, care or treatment of inmates, 
prisoners or patients therein.”  See Canady v. Reynolds, 880 P.2d 391, 398 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1994) (concluding that prisoner cannot appeal loss of good time credits through state 
Administrative Procedure Act, but that relief may be available through habeas corpus). 
 369. See Kellas v. DOC, 145 P.3d 139 (Or. 2006) (Oregon Supreme Court concluded that 
father of prisoner possessed standing under section 183.400 of the Oregon Statute to file petition 
for review challenging application of rules regarding credit for time son had served on house 
arrest.). 
 370. Chimenti v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 720 A.2d 205, 211 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (Rule 
regarding monitoring of inmate phone calls was a policy statement and not a “regulation” within 
the meaning of the Pennsylvania Administrative Procedure Act.).  See also Richardson v. Beard, 
942 A.2d 911, 913 (Pa. Commw. 2008) (A prisoner could file a petition for review of DOC policy 
without first filing grievance because he was not raising federal claims.). 
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include “(1) statements concerning only the 
internal management of an agency and not 
affecting private rights or procedures 
available to the public, or (2) declaratory 
rulings issued pursuant to Section 42-35-8, 
(3) intra-agency memoranda, or (4) an 






S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-10(4) (2005) 
(exempting from the definition of 
“regulation” orders “of the supervisory or 
administrative agency of a penal, mental, or 
medical institution, in respect to the 
institutional supervision, custody, control, 
care, or treatment of inmates, prisoners, or 
patients”).372
South Dakota Express partial 
exemption from 
rulemaking 
Rules affecting inmate disciplinary matters 
are exempt from the definition of “rule.”  
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-1(8)(g) 
(2004).373  See also § 1-15-20 (“The 
Department of Corrections at any time may 
promulgate rules, pursuant to chapter 1-26 
[state Administrative Procedure Act], 
concerning: (1) Public contact with inmates 
through telephone and mail services and 
visits; (2) Inmate release date calculations; 
(3) Standards for parole supervision and 
parolee contact; (4) Federal and out-of-state 
inmates housed in state correctional facilities; 
and (5) Inmate accounts.  The department 
may prescribe departmental policies and 
procedures for the management of its 
institutions and agencies, including inmate 
disciplinary matters.  Inmate disciplinary 
matters consist of all matters relating to 
 
 371. L’Heureux v. State Dep’t of Corr., 708 A.2d 549, 553 (R.I. 1998) (“[T]he APA is not 
applicable to classification proceedings, disciplinary proceedings, or rule making dealing with the 
internal affairs of the ACI by the DOC.”); Johnson v. State, No. 99-1007, 2002 WL 1803931 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. 2002) (Administrative Procedure Act did not apply to method for calculating good time 
under internal management exception). 
 372. But see Al-Shabazz v. State, 527 S.E.2d 742, 758 (S.C. 2000) (Although prison 
disciplinary hearings are not subject to all Administrative Procedure Act provisions, prisoners may 
obtain judicial review under the act.) 
 373. Inmates are also excluded from procedures for petitioning an agency to promulgate, 
amend, or repeal a rule, § 1-26-13, or for petitioning an agency for a declaratory ruling, § 1-26-15. 
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individual inmate behavior and to all matters 
relating to the maintenance of order, control, 
and safety within any institution under the 





“Statements concerning inmates of a 
correctional or detention facility” are exempt 
from the UAPA, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-
102(10)(G) (2005).  Section 4-5-106(b) also 
exempts “[d]isciplinary and job termination 
proceedings for inmates” from the definition 




Administrative Procedure Act states: “This 
chapter does not apply to a rule or internal 
procedure of the Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice or Texas Board of Criminal 
Justice that applies to an inmate or any other 
person under the custody or control of the 
department or to an action taken under that 
rule or procedure.”  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 2001.226 (Vernon 2008). 
Utah Bound by 
rulemaking 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-10(2) (2008) 
(“[t]he department may make rules in 
accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, to carry out 
the provisions of this chapter.”). 
Vermont Bound by 
rulemaking 
Title 3, section 831(a) of the Vermont Statute 
does not exempt the Vermont Department of 
Corrections from rulemaking procedures.375  
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 831(a) (2003). 
Virginia Express 
exemption from 
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4002(B) (2008) 
(“Agency action relating to the following 
 
 374. Abdur’rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292 (Tenn. 2005); Mandela v. Campbell, 978 
S.W.2d 531, 535 (Tenn. 1998) (Disciplinary policies and procedures are exempt from 
requirements of Tennesee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act.).  See also Clark v. Rose, 183 
S.W.3d 669, 674 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that although inmate disciplinary proceedings are 
exempt from review under the UAPA, non-disciplinary actions may be reviewed under the 
statute). 
 375. Parker v. Gorczyk, 787 A.2d 494 (Vt. 2001) (concluding that furlough policy generally 
applicable to prisoners was not exempt from rulemaking procedures).  Contra King v. Gorczyk, 
825 A.2d 16 (Vt. 2003) (policy directive regarding “random inmate drug testing” did not 
constitute a “rule” subject to the requirements of the Vermont Administrative Procedure Act 
because it did not “affect or alter the individual rights and obligations of plaintiff”).  These 
decisions provided judicial review under Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 74 and 75, 
respectively. 
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rulemaking subjects shall be exempted from the 
provisions of [the Administrative Procedure 
Act][:] . . . [i]nmates of prisons or other such 
facilities or parolees therefrom . . . [and] [t]he 
custody of persons in, or sought to be placed 
in, mental, penal or other state institutions as 
well as the treatment, supervision, or 






Wash. Dep’t of Corr., Policy Development 
and Implementation, DOC 100.100 (Aug. 17, 
2009), available at 
http://www.doc.wa.gov/policies/showFile.asp
x?name=100100; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
34.05.030 (West 2003) (“This chapter shall 
not apply to . . . [t]he department of 
corrections or the indeterminate sentencing 
review board with respect to persons who are 
in their custody or are subject to the 
jurisdiction of those agencies.”). 
West Virginia Partial express 
exemption from 
rulemaking 
Section 29A-1-3(c) of the West Virginia 
Code provides that the provisions of the state 
Administrative Procedure Act “do not apply 
to rules relating to or contested cases 
involving the conduct of inmates or other 
persons admitted to public institutions. . . .  
Such rules shall be filed in the state register 
in the form prescribed by this chapter and be 
effective upon filing.”  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 
29A-1-3(c) (LexisNexis 2007).  But see § 31-
20-9(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2003) (providing that 
the Jail Standards Commission promulgate 
legislative rules under West Virginia 
Administrative Procedure Act to implement 
 
 376. See also Porter v. Commonwealth., 661 S.E. 2d 415, 432-33 (Va. 2008) (concluding that 
Virginia execution procedures were not subject to Virginia Administrative Procedure Act because 
“the Virginia Department of Corrections is an agency whose sole purpose is related to inmates of 
prisons,” and “is thus exempt from the strictures of the APA”).  However, the Virginia 
Department of Corrections has promulgated “public participation guidelines” for rulemaking 
regarding non-exempt provisions, including provision for a notification list, public hearings, 
regulatory advisory panels, petitions for rulemaking, and public comment.  See 6 VA. ADMIN. 
CODE § 15-11-10 et seq (2009). 
 377. State ex rel. White v. Parsons, 483 S.E.2d 1, 10 (W. Va. 1997) (concluding that Jail 
Correctional Facilities Standards Commission had failed to adequately consider the views of the 
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minimum standards for jails).377
Wisconsin Bound by 
rulemaking 
Rules adopting procedures for good time 
forfeiture were invalid unless promulgated 
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure 
Act, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.01 (West 2009), 
because they were rules of general 
applicability.  State ex rel. Clifton v. Young, 







WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-105(a) (2009): 
“The department of corrections shall adopt 
rules and regulations necessary to carry out 
its functions.  The promulgation of 
substantive rules by the department, the 
conduct of its hearings and its final decisions 
are specifically exempt from all provisions of 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 
including the provisions for judicial review. . 
. .  The department’s rules shall be filed in 




Commissioner of Corrections in promulgating a complete ban on tobacco products at jail 
facilities). 
 378. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.03(4) (West 2009) provides: “The provisions of this chapter 
relating to contested cases do not apply to . . . proceeding[s] involving the care and treatment of a 
resident or an inmate of a correctional institution.” 
